Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters by Stromseth, Jane E
Book Review
Understanding Constitutional War Powers
Today: Why Methodology Matters
Presidential War Power. By Louis Fisher.* Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1995. Pp. xvi, 245. $29.95 (hbk.), $14.95 (pbk.).
Jane E. Stromseth'
In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the
clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature,
and not to the executive department .... [T]he trust and the
temptation would be too great for any one man ....
-James Madison'
Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment in
politics of tying up the hands of government from offensive war
founded upon reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not to disable
it from guarding the community against the ambition or enmity of
other nations.
-Alexander Hamilton2
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I. ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES MADISON, LE'rERS OF PACIFlCUS AND HELVIDIUS ON TE
PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALrrY OF 1793, at 89 (James Madison) (Washington, D.C.. J. Gideon & G.S
Gideon 1845). Madison continued:
War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement.... The strongest passions and most
dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; ambition, avarice, vanity, the honourable or venial
love of fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace. Hence it has grown into
an axiom that the executive is the department of power most distinguished by its propensity to
war- hence it is the practice of all states, in proportion as they are free. to disarm this propensity
of its influence.
Id. at 89-90.
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 208 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961). Hamilton
continued:
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With the Cold War over, Americans have grown more introspective about
the role of the United States in global affairs. It could hardly be otherwise.
America's rise to military preeminence, its overseas commitments and
priorities, and its basic sense of international purpose all were forged by
circumstances of the past fifty years that have changed dramatically. The
Soviet threat is gone; once shaky allies in Europe and Asia are now
comparatively stable and prosperous; the specter of cataclysmic nuclear war
has receded while regional conflicts, ethnic strife, and humanitarian
emergencies have moved to center stage. Although the world is no less violent
than it was before, the American public feels comparatively more secure. That
fact alone has led many Americans to reassess what the international posture
of the United States ought to be and what sacrifices they are prepared to make
to advance American interests and values abroad. Moreover, in the absence of
an overarching Soviet threat, the commitment of U.S. armed forces overseas
has become a more divisive issue domestically, and the question of Congress's
constitutional role in such decisions has taken on new significance.
During the Cold War era, successive presidents claimed broad authority
as the Commander in Chief 3 to send American troops into combat, not only
to defend American forces and citizens abroad but also to defend allies and to
protect U.S. security interests as the President defined them.4 Presidents often
simply informed Congress of deployment decisions already made, or nominally
consulted with some members, but rarely asked the full Congress to authorize
combat operations. Congress, despite its constitutional power to "declare
War,"'5 grew comfortable playing a reactive role during the Cold War years,
"scolding" the President after the fact if military action went wrong,6 but
rarely insisting on advance approval even when doing so might have been
possible.7 This war powers pattern-reinforced by judicial abstention-was
Let us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our option; that however moderate
or unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the
ambition of others .... To judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to
conclude that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with much
more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our
political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquillity would be to calculate on the weaker
springs of the human character.
Id.
3. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of
the United States .... ).
4. See Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 185 (1995); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINoER, JR..
THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 127-76 (1973) (discussing case of Korean War); FRANCIS D. WORMTI &
EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR at ix (2d ed. 1989) (noting claims of presidential war
power since Korean War).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
6. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 54 (1993).
7. The Persian Gulf War was a notable exception to this pattern. See Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking
War Powers: Congress, the President. and the United Nations, 81 GEo. L.J. 597, 653-54 (1993).
[Vol. 106: 845
War Powers
heralded by many presidents as an appropriate and necessary response to the
Cold War dangers confronting the United States.!
Strong arguments can be made that this pattern of presidential assertion
and congressional passivity was never constitutionally sound.9 Whatever its
validity, however, the sense of national emergency that sustained this pattern
has dissipated, with the result that American officials (and members of the
public as well) now look at many current conflict situations in a dramatically
different light. For example, the civil strife in Somalia and Haiti, which
policymakers previously would have viewed through a strategic lens as part of
the larger U.S.-Soviet struggle, are now seen mainly as humanitarian crises. At
the same time, the range of conflicts inviting the possible deployment of armed
forces for operations other than war has expanded. American troops are
deployed abroad today not only to defend and reassure U.S. allies but also to
contain the spread of conflict, as in Macedonia; to implement complex peace
agreements, as in Bosnia; and to help build domestic stability, as in Haiti.
Multilateral organizations, particularly the United Nations (UN) and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), play a greater role in authorizing and
fielding operations both in peacetime and in conflict situations. All these
developments provide much grist for future struggles over war powers between
Congress and the President.
In short, now that the pressures of the Cold War have receded and the
United States enters a complex new era in international affairs, the age-old
question of the constitutional division of war powers between Congress and the
President should be reexamined. Louis Fisher's timely book, Presidential War
Power,' is a helpful historical resource for beginning this effort. Fisher
provides a concise survey of executive-legislative practice regarding the
commitment of U.S. combat forces abroad, from the earliest days of the
Republic to the recent involvement of U.S. forces in Somalia, Haiti, and
Bosnia, presenting his analysis in an accessible case study format. Fisher not
only examines the major war powers issues that have arisen since 1789 and the
various claims advanced by presidents in favor of an expanded war powers
role; he also ably integrates into his historical survey a discussion of seminal
judicial decisions. The result is a readable and well-documented book of
interest to the general public and use to scholars.
The overarching theme of Fisher's book is that a sharp tension exists
between the Founders' original understanding of the constitutional allocation
of war powers and most post-World War II practice. "The constitutional
framework adopted by the framers is clear in its basic principles," Fisher
8. See, e.g., id. at 633, 636-37 (discussing claims of President Truman); SCHLESINGER. supra note 4.
at 187-90 (discussing claims of President Nixon).
9. For a particularly thoughtful argument, see S. REP. No. 91-129. at 7-10. 30-32 (1969) (herenafltr
NATIONAL COMMITMENr'TS REPORT].
10. FISHER, supra note 4.
1996]
The Yale Law Journal
argues." The Founders gave Congress the authority "to initiate war"'2 or "to
mount offensive actions,"' 3 while the President, as Commander in Chief,
"could act unilaterally only in one area: to repel sudden attacks" against the
United States or American armed forces.' 4 With limited exceptions, the two
political branches largely adhered to this basic understanding, Fisher argues,
from 1789 to the end of the nineteenth century. A few deviations occurred in
the early twentieth century as the United States emerged as a global power.
Since the end of World War II, however, "[t]he trend of presidential war
power"' 5 consistently has conflicted with "the constitutional framework
adopted by the founding fathers,"'16 Fisher contends, and "[p]residents have
regularly breached constitutional principles and democratic values."'17 Fisher,
in short, draws a striking contrast between the consistent practice of
congressional authorization of war in the earlier years of the Republic and the
often perfunctory, last-minute notice and consultations common today.
Fisher rejects the various claims advanced by modem presidents to justify
war powers beyond repelling sudden attacks on American territory or
forces.'8 These include claims based on expanded concepts of defensive war
and on treaties such as the United Nations Charter. Fisher contends that neither
America's more significant global role nor changes in weapons technology
since 1789 provide compelling reasons to understand the constitutional war
powers of Congress and the President differently today. He concludes with
specific proposals for restoring checks and balances, including a reinvigorated
War Powers Resolution; 19 but above all he urges Congress to assert itself and
use the tools at its disposal (especially the power of the purse) to fulfill its
constitutional role.20
Presidential War Power is an urgent plea to politicians, scholars, and the
American public to reexamine our Constitution, our history, and our current
practice. Fisher's fundamental point is compelling: The power to commence
war was given to Congress under the Constitution and should remain there,
notwithstanding executive claims or recent practice to the contrary. The
Founders' conviction that no one person should have such enormous power,
but that the legislature as a whole should make the critical decision for war on
behalf of the people whose lives and resources would be placed at risk,
11. Id. at I1.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 13.
14. Id. at 7.
15. Id. at xi.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id. at xi, 161, 185.
19. See War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1994).
20. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 199-206.
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reflected republican principles and a view of human nature that have lost
neither their contemporary relevance nor their normative appeal. 2'
Fisher's book is far less helpful, however, in addressing the Constitution's
allocation of power with regard to small-scale military operations that do not
clearly involve initiating "war" or mounting "offensive" action against another
state. Examples include the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia in
"Operation Restore Hope" to help create a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations and U.S. military involvement in Bosnia, first
to protect UN-designated "safe haven" zones and, currently, to implement the
Dayton Peace Agreement. Yet these are precisely the kinds of scenarios likely
to preoccupy the United States in the coming years.
Resolving war powers questions raised by cases such as these, and indeed
more generally, requires a searching examination of fundamental
methodological questions in constitutional interpretation: How clear is the
"original understanding" of the Constitution's allocation of war powers, and
to what extent should original intent guide constitutional interpretation today?
Can the basic purposes the Founders sought to advance in their allocation of
war powers be convincingly "translated" into our very different world and, if
so, how?2 What significance does historical practice under the Constitution
from the Founding to the present hold for understanding the respective war
powers of Congress and the President today? These are the critical questions
that divide war powers scholars.
Yet Fisher's book, despite its other virtues, gives these questions less
attention than they require if the debate over war powers is to move forward
at all in the post-Cold War period. For example, while Fisher's account of the
original understanding is persuasive in its essentials, his analysis would have
been more compelling had he critically engaged the major competing scholarly
accounts of original intent. Proponents of those alternative views raise
important questions about the scope of the President's defensive war powers
and the meaning of Congress's power to declare war that need to be taken
seriously. In addition, given the primacy of arguments based on historical
practice in the contemporary debate over war powers, the question of whether
(and how) that practice affects the Constitution's meaning today merits a more
extended discussion than Fisher's book provides. In particular, a more nuanced
analysis of America's many small-scale military actions from the Founding to
21. See ELY, supra note 6, at 5-9 (defending continued relevance of Foundcrs" '.ic. that decision to
commence war belongs to legislature, especially in light of standing army now at Presidcnt's disposal.
destructive power of modem weaponry, importance of public support for %ar. and lack of other cffccti'e
checks on unilateral executive action).
22. On the question of translating the Founders' purposes and prnciples into circumstances they did
not foresee, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTrrTmTON 121 (1993); MARK TLSIINEr. RED. WITrrE
AND BLUE: A CRMCAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 43-44 (1988). Larencc Lcssig. Fideltt in
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1165 (1993); Michael J. Perry. The Legittnacs of Particular Conception of
Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REv. 669. 714-17 (1991)
1996]
The Yale Law Journal
the present would be helpful in evaluating the respective authority of Congress
and the President over the commitment of U.S. forces to limited military
operations that do not necessarily commence "war." Indeed, translating the
Founders' animating purposes into our world is a more complex endeavor than
Fisher's book acknowledges, at least with regard to recent American
involvement in a diverse array of UN-authorized military operations of varying
size and scope. A fuller recognition of complexities such as these is essential
to addressing the truly difficult war powers issues today. Finally, the question
of reform-of restoring checks and balances-is critically important if Fisher
is right (as I think he is) about the need to diminish the tension between the
broad war powers asserted by recent presidents and the Founders' vision of
legislative deliberation before the country commences war. Yet, because the
underlying factors producing this tension are even more deep-seated and
complex than those that Fisher identifies, his reform proposals are unlikely to
bridge the gap.
This Book Review explores some of the rich methodological and
substantive questions implicated by Fisher's book. Part I examines the question
of the Founders' original understanding of constitutional war powers,
contrasting Fisher's interpretation with the main alternative accounts and
offering my own view. Part II discusses the patterns in historical practice that
Fisher identifies and then explores the normative significance of that practice
for the constitutional division of war powers today. Part III addresses the
challenging question of how to understand Congress's power to declare war
and the President's authority to repel sudden attacks in a modem world very
different from the Founders'. Finally, Part IV examines the factors that have
contributed to a diminished congressional war powers role during the Cold
War years and explores whether, with the end of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation,
that role will increase in the future.
I. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING: BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES
Like other thoughtful war powers scholars, Fisher grounds his view of
constitutional war powers in an understanding of the original purposes
underlying the Constitution's text. The Founders, argues Fisher in his opening
chapter, decisively rejected existing European models of government that
placed the power to commence war in the hands of the monarch. In contrast
to John Locke and William Blackstone, who viewed the power of war as an
executive prerogative, the Founders "deliberately transferred the power to
initiate war from the executive to the legislature. ' 23 Congress's war powers
included not only the power to declare "perfect" or unlimited war, but also the
23. FISHER, supra note 4, at 1.
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power to authorize limited hostilities (or "imperfect" war)." The Founders'
decision to give these powers to Congress reflected the republican principle
that such enormous power should rest not in a single set of hands but in the
collective judgment of the legislature.2 The Founders expected, moreover,
that collective deliberation would make initiation of war more difficult. As
James Wilson explained to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, the system
adopted
will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will
not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to
involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war
is vested in the legislature at large ....
Although the President could not unilaterally declare or initiate war, the
Founders recognized that emergencies could arise, such as an attack against the
United States or its forces, that would require immediate defensive action and
would allow no time for advance congressional approval. Thus they reserved
to the President "'the power to repel sudden attacks."' 27 They also agreed that
once military action was begun-whether authorized by Congress or thrust
upon the United States by attack-the President as Commander in Chief should
direct the military operations. The Founders wanted not war by committee, but
unity of command as well as ultimate civilian accountability. 2 At the same
time, they gave Congress the power of the purse and the power to raise and
support military forces, so that the means of carrying on a war would not be
in the hands of the person who would conduct it. In short, Fisher argues, the
Constitution's basic allocation of war powers was clear, with the critical power
of initiating war vested in Congress.
Fisher presents what I will call the "classical" view of the original
understanding of war powers. This basic account is extremely persuasive in
light of the primary sources available to us from the Constitution's framing
and ratification, including the Founders' reflections on prior British and
American experience. History taught the Founders that the executive was the
branch of government "most interested in war" and "most prone to it"; "9 and
24. See id. at 2-3, 9; see infra text accompanying notes 49-51 (dtscussing difference bet &cn
"perfect" and "imperfect" war).
25. See FISHER, supra note 4, at I, 4.
26. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-TIONS. ON TIE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPIIA IN 1787. at 528
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Washington, D.C., U.S. Cong. 1836) [hereinafter THE DEBATES IN TniE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS] (remarks of James Wilson).
27. FISHER, supra note 4, at 6 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF TiE FEDERAL CoNvE,'noN OF 1787. at
318 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
28. See iii at 9-10.
29. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2. 1798). i 6 TIE WRmNGS OF JAMES
MADISON 312 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); see also ELY, supra note 6. at 3-4 (noting that influential Framers
regarded executives as more "warlike" than legislatures).
1996]
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their views about human nature led them to fear that presidents, like kings
before them, might be tempted to initiate war for reasons of personal
"ambition" and "aggrandizement,"3 more than for the good of the people.3
Vesting the power to declare or commence war in the legislature as a whole,
including the House of Representatives, would "clog[] ''32 the path to war and
permit deliberation by a diverse group of people before the nation embarked
on a course so full of risks.33 It would also better ensure, in James Wilson's
words, "that nothing but our national interest can draw us into a war."
34
Including the House in the decision to initiate war also ensured that the
American people, who would bear the burdens of war, had a voice in that
decision through their most immediate federal representatives.
Like Fisher, many other scholars who have steeped themselves in the
original sources from the Founding period have come to similar conclusions
about the original understanding. For example, Charles Lofgren concludes in
a carefully documented article that the Constitution as originally understood
"vested Congress with control over the commencement of war, whether
declared or undeclared. 35 Taylor Reveley, in his thoughtful study, contends
that "[t]he Constitutional Fathers' grant of authority to Congress to declare war
and issue letters of marque and reprisal almost certainly was intended to
convey control over all involvement of American forces in combat, except in
response to sudden attack. '36 Francis Wormuth and Edwin Firmage's helpful
historical examination of war powers likewise concludes that "Congress
exclusively possesses the constitutional power to initiate war, whether declared
or undeclared, public or private, perfect or imperfect, de jure or de facto," with
30. HAMILTON & MADISON, supra note 1, at 89 (James Madison).
31. See WoRMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 4, at 298. Abraham Lincoln expressed it well:
The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress, was dictated,
as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always been involving and
impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the
people was the object. This, our convention understood to be the most oppressive of all Kingly
oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the
power of bringing this oppression upon us.
Letter from Abraham Lincoln to William H. Herndon (Feb. 15, 1848), in I THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 451, 451-52 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
32. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 27, at 317 (remarks of
George Mason).
33. See ELY, supra note 6, at 3-4 (explaining that Founders understood war's dangers and sought to
make entry into war difficult by requiring legislature's deliberation and concurrence).
34. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 26, at 528 (remarks of James
Wilson).
35. Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE
L.J. 672, 697 (1972); see also id. at 699 ("Congress' power 'to declare War' was not understood in a
narrow technical sense ....").
36. W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 63-64 (1981).
Reveley continues: "Most happily viewed for presidential prerogative .... the Framers' substitution of
'declare' for 'make' permitted executive response to ongoing physical attack on American
territory-conceivably, also, preemptive strikes by the President against impending attack-until Congress
can decide what further steps should be taken." Id. at 64; see also id. at 101-06 (discussing ratifiers'
understandings of Congress's war powers and of President's powers as Commander in Chief).
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the only exception being the President's power "to respond self-defensively to
sudden attack upon the United States."" Abraham Sofaer, in his
comprehensive study of the Founding and early practice relating to war
powers, views some aspects of the allocation of those powers as more flexible
and open-ended than Fisher does, 3' but still concludes that nothing in the
framing and ratification debates suggests that the President, as Commander in
Chief, possessed "an undefined reservoir of power to use the military in
situations unauthorized by Congress. 39 Other scholars have reached similar
conclusions.40
While Fisher's classical account is persuasive in its basic outline, his
discussion of the original understanding of war powers would have been more
convincing had he seriously engaged and analyzed the main alternative
scholarly accounts. The two major competing accounts I will call the
"offensive/defensive war" view of the original understanding and the "formal
war/shared power" view. These alternative accounts raise a number of
challenges to the classical view that warrant careful response.
The "offensive/defensive war" account of original intent recognizes that
the President cannot initiate "offensive war" against another nation without
congressional authorization, but views the President as empowered to engage
in "defensive war" in circumstances beyond repelling attacks against the
United States or its forces. Advancing the "offensive/defensive war" view,
Robert Turner stresses that under the law of nations at the Founding,
declarations of war were acts associated with initiating offensive hostilities, but
defending against war initiated by another state did not require a
declaration.41 Invoking arguments advanced by Alexander Hamilton and other
37. WORMuTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 4, at 299; see also id. at 22 ("[O]nly in a state of war, whether
initiated by hostile invasion or by congressional declaration, does the President have the nght to go beyond
self-defense and initiate offensive action.").
38. See infra notes 69, 85-90, 250 and accompanying text.
39. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, I WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTI'uTiONAL POWER 36 (1976); see
also id. at 4 ("The Constitution says Congress shall 'declare' war. and it seems unreasonable to contend
that the President was given the power to 'make' undeclared war. especially since the Constitution gives
Congress control of those types of military actions short of formal war commonly resorted to during that
time."); id. at 48 (noting that Founders' debates over Commander in Chief's power "contained no hint of
any authority based on this provision to use the armed forces without legislative approval")
40. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 6, at 3 ('"he power to declare war was constitutionally bestd in
Congress. The debates, and early practice, establish that this meant that all wars. big or small. 'declared'
in so many words or not-most weren't, even then-had to be legislatively authonzed.") (footnotes
omitted); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTrTLrrONAL DIPLOMACY 80-84 (1990). LoutS HEKIN,
CONSITUrlONALISM, DFiOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 33 (1990) [hereinafter HeNKIN,
CONSTrrUTrrONALISM, DEMiOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS): Louis HENKIN. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TilE
CONsTrrUTION 80-81 (1972) [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TilE CoNSTTrrTTlo.;
SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 4 ("What does seem clear is that no one wanted either to deny the President
the power to respond to surprise attack or to give the President general power to initiate hostilities.-);
Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs The Intent of the Constution
Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REv. 527. 608 (1974).
41. See Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Consrttution: A
Review Essay of John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility. 34 VA. J. INr'L L 903. 906-10 (1994)
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Founders, moreover, Turner argues that Congress's power to "declare War"
should be interpreted narrowly because it is an exception to the general grant
of executive power to the President under Article II of the Constitution.42
Congress's war-declaring power thus "pertains only to the authorization of
such offensive initiation of military force as would have required a formal
declaration of war at the time the Constitution was drafted," Turner
contends.43 The power of the President, as Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive, in contrast, should be understood as including the power to commit
American forces to defensive war, not only to defend the United States or its
forces from attack, but also to defend other countries as well and to implement
treaties,44 even if ample time to obtain congressional approval exists.
The advocates of the "offensive/defensive war" view are right to look to
the law of nations at the Founding for insights on the Founders' understanding
of war powers.45 Yet they ultimately interpret Congress's war powers too
narrowly, in my view, in part by paying insufficient attention to the Marque
and Reprisal Clause4 6 and the question of limited war. The precise meaning
of the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal evolved over a period of
centuries.47 By the time the Constitution was adopted, the expression had
come "to signify any intermediate or low-intensity hostility short of declared
war that utilized public or private forces, although the emphasis on the use of
private forces remained. ' 48 When issued in peacetime, letters of marque and
reprisal gave nations a means to resolve disputes with other nations short of
resorting to full-scale war. Eighteenth-century statesmen and writers on the law
of nations referred to reprisals, in particular, as acts of limited hostility or
"imperfect war" that interrupted the public tranquillity only partially and that
42. See id. at 933-34, 947-49. Hamilton advanced this view in his famous colloquy with James
Madison over President Washington's decision in 1793 to declare American neutrality in the war between
Britain and France. Hamilton, in defending the President's action, took a pro-executive view of the conduct
of foreign relations, contending that Article II's grant of executive power to the President included control
of foreign relations. That executive power, Hamilton argued, was limited only by those powers expressly
conferred upon Congress, such as the power to declare war and grant letters of marque and reprisal, and
such "exceptions" should be narrowly construed. See HAMILTON & MADISON, supra note I, at 10-14
(Alexander Hamilton).
James Madison took a more limited view of executive power over foreign affairs. The executive "may
be a convenient organ of preliminary communications with foreign governments, on the subjects of treaty
or war," Madison argued, but the war-making and treaty-making powers were "substantially of a legislative,
not an executive nature, [and thus] the rule of interpreting exceptions strictly must narrow, instead of
enlarging, executive pretensions on those subjects." Id. at 58 (James Madison).
43. Turner, supra note 41, at 914; see also J. Terry Emerson, Making War Without a Declaration, 17
J. LEGis. 23, 30-31 (1990).
44. See Turner, supra note 41, at 914-15.
45. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27-29
(1967) (noting that Founders relied upon Emer de Vattel, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, and other writers on
law of nations).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. II ("The Congress shall have Power To... grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal .... ).
47. See Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134
U. PA. L. REv. 1035, 1042-45 (1986).
48. Id. at 1045.
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generally had the narrow objective of rectifying a specific injustice.49 The
Founding generation understood, however, that state reprisals could and often
did lead to full-fledged or "perfect" war 0 As Secretary of State, Thomas
Jefferson wrote, "IT]he making of reprisal on a nation is a very serious
thing.... [that] is considered as an act of war, & never yet failed to produce
it in the case of a nation able to make war."5' Thus, "the right of reprisal [is]
expressly lodged with [Congress] by the constitution, & not with the
executive. 52 In other words, the power to commence even limited acts of war
against another nation belonged explicitly to Congress because of the
potentially serious consequences, most notably the risk of escalation to a wider
conflict.
The "offensive/defensive war" account also interprets the President's
defensive war powers more broadly than is firmly warranted by evidence from
the Constitution's framing and ratification or the subsequent practice of the
Founding generation. To be sure, the distinction between "offensive war" and
"defensive war" was a familiar one to the Founders,53 and they clearly
49. See, e.g., 2 JJ. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLrC LAw 180 (photo rcpnnt
1972) (Nugent trans., corrected 5th ed., n.p., Cambridge Umv. Press 1807); 2 HUGO GROnIUS. DE JL'lE
BELLI Ac PACTS LIBRI TRES [THE LAW OF WAR & PEACE: THREE BooKs] 626-28 (Francis W. Kelsey
trans., 1925). The major writers on the law of nations familiar to the Founders defined "var" broadly as
a state or condition in which force is used to resolve disputes. See. e.g.. BURLASIAQLI. supra. at 157,
GROTIUS, supra, at 33; EMER DE VATrFL, THE LAw OF NATIONS 291 (Joseph Chtt) cd. & trans,
Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1867). They went on to draw distinctions between different types
of "war," such as "perfect" and "'imperfect" war.
50. See, e.g., BURLAMAQUI, supra note 49, at 182 ("[R]epnsals are acts of hostiltty. and often the
prelude or forerunner of a complete and perfect war."): Lofgren. supra note 35, at 693
51. 6 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on "The Little Sarah". in THE WRRMNGS OF THIOtAS JEFFERSON
257, 259 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1895).
52. Id. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in 1798: "Any thing beyond [repelling force wi th force] must
fall under the idea of reprisals & requires the sanction of that Department which is to declare or make
war." Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 17. 1798). in 21 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 461, 462 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974).
53. According to the major international law treatises of the time, the distinction turned not on the
justice of the cause but, more straightforwardly, on who struck first. In Emer de Vattel's sords: "He who
takes up arms to repel the attack of an enemy, carries on a defensive war. He who is foremost in taking
up arms, and attacks a nation that lived in peace with him, wages offensive war." VlrEL.. supra note 49,
at 293 (emphasis added). Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui likewise wrote that "the first who takes up arms.
whether justly or unjustly, commences an offensive war, and he. who opposes him. whether with or w, ithout
a reason, begins a defensive war." BURLAMAQUI, supra note 49. at 174. Alexander Hamilton's analysis in
the Pacificus/Helvidius debate follows this understanding of the distinction between offensive and defensive
war. See HAMILTON & MADISON, supra note I, at 17-18 (Alexander Hamilton). The Founders generally
were familiar with the law of nations with regard to self-defense, as summanzed in the wntings of Grotius.
Vattel, Burlamaqui, and Samuel Pufendorf. Each of these writers agreed that if the enemy had made clear
his intention by attacking first, the defender did not need to give notice to the enemy by declanng war
Vattel, for example, wrote that "[h]e who is attacked and only wages defensive war. needs not to make any
hostile declaration,--the state of warfare being sufficiently ascertained by the enemy's declaration, or open
hostilities." VATrEL, supra note 49, at 316-17. According to Burlamaqut. "this declaration takes place only
in offensive wars; for, when we are actually attacked, that alone gives us reason to believe, that the enemy
is resolved not to listen to an accommodation." BURLAMAQUI. supra note 49. at 187 Grotius viewed self-
defense as part of the law of nature---or the natural impulse of self-preservation. According to Plato. wrote
Grotius, "a war which is undertaken to repel force is proclaimed, not by a herald, but by nature." GROTIUS.
supra note 49, at 634 (emphasis added); see also 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF. DE JURE NATvRAE El GETnUst
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distinguished between Congress's power to "commence" war and the
President's power to "repel" it.54 In affirming the President's power to "repel
sudden attacks," or to "repel ... war,' 55 however, the Founders gave no
indication that such a power extended to the defense of countries other than the
United States without Congress's authorization.56 The contemporaneous
concern with avoiding entangling alliances or involvement in "the commotions
of Europe" suggests an intent to the contrary. 57 Even Alexander Hamilton,
who later wrote that a congressional declaration of war was "nugatory" or
"unnecessary" when "a foreign nation declares, or openly and avowedly makes
war upon the United States,"5 8 focused on the President's power to respond
to aggression directed against the United States itself. In such cases, the
enemy, by its own actions, had placed the United States in a state of war, and
the President as Commander in Chief could respond accordingly.59 But if
another nation was attacked, the question whether the United States should
respond by going to war was still open, a judgment that was for Congress to
make.60 While Hamilton strongly defended President Washington's decision
LIBRI Ocro [ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS: EIGHT BOOKS] 1307 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A.
Oldfather trans., 1934) (referring to Grotius).
54. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 27, at 318
(reflecting remarks of Roger Sherman) ("The Executive shd. be able to repel and not to commence war.").
55. Id. (reflecting remarks of James Madison, Elbridge Gerry, and Roger Sherman).
56. See, e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen, Constitutional Constraints: The War Clause, in THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR 29,42 (Gary M. Stem & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994)
("There is utterly no support in the history of the framing and ratification of the War Clause for any claim
that the framers intended the implied repel-sudden-attack power of the President to include attacks on other
nations.").
57. As James Wilson told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, "we.. . are not obliged to throw
ourselves into the scale with any." 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 26,
at 528.
58. 25 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Examination: Number 1, in THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 444, 456 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1977).
59. See id. James Madison likewise argued, "The only case in which the Executive can enter on a war,
undeclared by Congress, is when a state of war has 'been actually' produced by the conduct of another
power." Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Nov. 16, 1827), in 3 LETrERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 600 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865). He stressed, however, that
even then "it ought to be made known as soon as possible to the Department charged with the war power,"
as President Jefferson had done after Tripoli both declared and made war against the United States. See id.;
see also United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342) (holding that President
has power to repel invasions by hostile forces but not to initiate war).
60. See 8 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Examination of Jefferson's Message to Congress of December 7,
1801, in THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 246, 249 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904) ("(It Is the
peculiar and exclusive province of Congress, when the nation is at peace, to change that state into a state
of war; whether from calculations of policy, or from provocations or injuries received."). According to
international law treatises familiar to the Founders, moreover, even a treaty entered into for defensive
purposes did not automatically oblige one ally to come to the aid of another if the country under attack had
itself committed an unjust action. An ally could also decline to respond if the risks to its own security were
too great, suggesting at least some room for judgment about whether to go to war on an ally's behalf. See,
e.g., VATTEL, supra note 49, at 325-26. Hamilton analyzed the Treaty of Alliance between France and the
United States with this understanding. See HAMILTON & MADISON, supra note 1, at 24-27 (Alexander
Hamilton); see also Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 1771, 1783-84 (1968) (arguing that decision to defend another state from attack amounts to
"commencing war" from viewpoint of United States and thus is for Congress to make).
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in 1793 to declare neutrality in the war between Britain and France (and
argued its consistency with the Treaty of Alliance between the United States
and France),6' he also agreed with Madison that the power to change the state
of the nation from peace to war was Congress's alone: "[T]he legislature can
alone declare war, can alone actually transfer the nation from a state of peace
to a state of hostility .... 62 In sum, while the evidence from the Founding
admittedly is partial, on balance it points against a broad unilateral presidential
power to engage in "defensive war" on behalf of allies or other friendly
nations without congressional authorization.
The second alternative account of the original understanding of war
powers, which I will call the "formal war/shared power" view, is really a
family of views that emphasize several common themes. First, proponents of
this account interpret Congress's power to "declare War" extremely narrowly
as the power to place the nation in a formal legal state of war, which they
define by reference to the law of nations at the Founding.6 3 Second,
proponents of the "formal war/shared power" view argue that the Founders
intended no one procedure for deciding on war or the use of force more
generally. The Founders instead gave overlapping war powers to Congress and
61. See HAMILTON & MADISON, supra note I. at 24-28 (Alexander Hamilton)
62. Id. at 14 (Alexander Hamilton). In contrast, "'[tit is the province and duty of the executive to
preserve to the nation the blessings of peace." Id. Hamilton ackno, ledged that Congress's po%cr to declare
war "include[d] the right of judging, whether the nation is or is not under (treaty] obligations to make %,ar *
Id. at 11. The President, as Chief "Executor of the laws." could also judge the country's treaty obligations.
Hamilton argued, and, in the case at hand, declare neutrality, een though the consequences of such an act
could affect the legislature's exercise of its power to declare war. While the legislature s as "'free to perform
its duties, according to its own sense of them." Hamilton wrote. "the executive. in the exercise of its
constitutional powers, may establish an antecedent state of things, which ought to weigh in the legislative
decisions." Id. at 13.
James Madison took issue with Hamilton. fearing that his analysis of executise power might someday
be used to argue that the President could "judge and conclude that the obligations of treaty impose war.
as well as that they permit peace." Id. at 87 (James Madison). The American people should be watchful
against the "new principles and new constructions" advanced by Hamilton. Madison warned. See id. If
presidents in the future were not only to claim authority to interpret U.S. treaty obligations as imposing
war but also to assert authority to "carry those obligations into effect." id. at 87, the executive could bnng
the country into war "notwithstanding the express provision in the constitution, by which the legislature
is made the organ of the national will, on questions, whether there be or be not a cause for declaring war."
Id. at 86. Madison "admonishe[d] the public" to adhere rigidly *'to the simple, the received, and the
fundamental doctrine of the constitution, that the power to declare war, including the power of judging of
the causes of war, is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature." Id. at 89.
While Madison was prescient in his concern that presidents in the future might invoke treaty
obligations as a basis for taking the country into war without congressional authorization, it is worth
emphasizing that Hamilton did not advance that particular argument here. On the contrary, he agreed with
Madison that "(tlhe legislature alone can interrupt (the blessings of peace] by placing the naton in a state
of war." Id. at 14 (Alexander Hamilton). They disagreed, however, over the President's authority to create
"an antecedent state of things" affecting Congress's war powers.
63. See, e.g., The Constitutional Roles of Congress and the President in Declaring and Waging War:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 102d Cong. 465-69 (1991) [hereinafter Consttutional
War Powers Hearings] (statement of Gary Bom); Philip Bobbitt. War Powers: An Essay on John Hart
Ely's War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath. 92 Micl4. L REv.
1364, 1375-76 (1994); Eugene V. Rostow, "Once More unto the Breach": The War Powers Resolution
Revisited, 21 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 6 (1986); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of War Powers. 84 CAL L. REv. 167, 242-49 (1996).
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the President and expected that they would both cooperate and struggle in a
flexible system of checks and balances.
Eugene Rostow advances a particularly thoughtful version of the "formal
war/shared power" view. Rostow stresses that he is more interested in the basic
purposes and principles reflected in the Constitution-such as "checks and
balances in the exercise of shared powers, and civilian control of the
military"-than in the Founders' specific intent regarding the power to use
armed force.64 In dividing "the foreign affairs and war powers between
Congress and the President," Rostow argues, "the great purpose of the
Constitution is to fullfil [sic] the twin objectives of executive effectiveness and
democratic responsibility: a strong, energetic President and a strong, energetic
Congress. 65 Rostow stresses that the Founders were acutely aware of the
dangers facing America and that they desired a strong national government,
and a strong President in particular, to protect the young country from external
threats.66 Rostow also emphasizes that the Founders recognized that the future
was unpredictable and they thus sought to create a system of government
sufficiently flexible to adapt and endure in the face of changing conditions.
Even as he emphasizes broad principles, however, Rostow also contends
that Congress's power to "declare War" had a very clear and specific meaning
to the Founders, who understood it in terms of the law of nations. By giving
Congress the power to declare war, Rostow argues, the Constitution vested in
the legislature alone the power to place the United States in a legal "state of
war"-which under the law of nations "contemplate[d] unlimited hostilities
between the belligerents" and other far-reaching domestic and international
consequences. 67 But all uses of force, "however bloody and extended," are
not "war" in this formal legal sense, Rostow argues,68 and the President, as
Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, has constitutional authority to use
force short of formal war in exercising U.S. rights under international law,
absent valid legislation to the contrary.69 More generally, Rostow argues, a
64. Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TsX. L. REV. 833, 844
(1972). Indeed, Rostow questions whether twentieth-century observers can truly understand how the
Founders perceived the world. See id.
65. Rostow, supra note 63, at 3-4.
66. See Rostow, supra note 64, at 844-46.
67. Rostow, supra note 63, at 6.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 10 (paraphrasing SOFAER, supra note 39, at 5). Rostow contends that,
the President can use or threaten to use the armed forces without any action by Congress both
in support of his diplomacy and in situations where international law justifies the limited and
proportional use of force in times of peace in order to deal with forceful breaches of
international law by another state.
Rostow, supra note 63, at 17; see also id. at 17-18 ("Thus military actions to preserve the nation's
maritime rights, protect its citizens or other nationals abroad, or carry out its treaty obligations, do not
require Congressional approval, before or after the event."). Abraham Sofaer agrees with Rostow that the
Founders, as a general matter, expected the President to exercise the nation's rights under international law,
but he views the President's power in that regard more narrowly than does Rostow. See Abraham D.
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broad area of shared authority exists on an "arc" between the President's
exclusive power to conduct diplomacy at one end and Congress's exclusive
power to declare war at the other.70 In this realm of concurrent power, the
Founders expected the President to take the initiative in protecting America's
security and foreign policy interests, while Congress ultimately possessed the
"last word."'" This flexible system, Rostow argues, furthers the Founders'
broad goals of "effective government" and "democratic responsibility,"' '
while avoiding the tyranny of kings.
Rostow raises several very important points. He correctly emphasizes the
diversity and range of military actions and force deployments that are a vital
and integral part of foreign policy in a dangerous world, and he properly
argues that not all of these are tantamount to commencing "war" for
constitutional purposes. He also cogently stresses that the President must be
able to make "credible threat[s] to use force as an instrument of deterrent
diplomacy ' 73 to protect America's interests and to prevent "confrontation[s]
which might escalate." 74 The Founders undoubtedly understood the need for
a President who could act decisively and flexibly to protect America's security
in an unstable and uncertain world, as well as the need for an enduring system
of checks and balances.
Yet my own reading of the sources from the Founding ultimately
convinces me that Rostow's understanding of Congress's constitutional war
powers is too narrow. Congress's power to "declare War," together with its
power to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," is best understood, as the
classical view contends, as the power not only to place the nation in a legal
state of "perfect" or unlimited war, but also to decide whether the country
should commence "imperfect" or limited war against another state." Many
Founders likely viewed the "declare War" Clause by itself as vesting this
power in Congress, as Justice Story suggests in his Commentaries on the
Constitution.76 Even if the "declare War" Clause is read more narrowly,
Sofaer, The Power Over War, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 33. 50-51 (1995). Among other things. "such acts as
reprisals and captures would be improper without legislative approval." Id. at 42.
70. See Rostow, supra note 64, at 871; see id. at 850. 864.
71. Id. at 865.
72. Rostow, supra note 63, at 48.
73. Rostow, supra note 64, at 838.
74. Id. at 896.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26, 35-40, 46-52.
76. As Story wrote:
The power to declare war may be exercised by congress, not only by authorizing general
hostilities, in which case the general laws of war apply to our situation: or by partial hostilities.
in which case the laws of war, so far as they actually apply to our situaUon. are to be observed
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE cONSTITLMON § 1169. at 62 (Boston. Hilliard. Gray, & Co.
1833); see also Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1. 28 (1801) (Marshall. CJ.) ("The wshole powers of
war being, by the constitution of the United States. vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be
resorted to as our guides in this inquiry. It is not denied... that congress may authorize general
hostilities . . . or partial hostilities .... ); Bas v. Tingy. 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 37. 43 (1800) (Chas . I)
1996]
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however, the Marque and Reprisal Clause vested in Congress the power over
reprisals, which were the most common form of limited and undeclared war
at that time. Rostow says very little, however, about the Marque and Reprisal
Clause, and instead seems to view congressional authorization of limited or
"imperfect" war as a matter of prudence rather than as a constitutional
requirement.77 Yet the Constitution not only reflects the Founders' broad
goals of "effective government" and "democratic responsibility," as Rostow
contends; it also clearly and more specifically reflects the republican principle
that no "one man" should possess the power to commence war against a
country with which the United States is at peace,78 whether the war is
formally declared or limited, or to initiate acts of war, such as reprisals, that
could easily escalate or lead to perfect war. In other words, the war powers
given to Congress are more far-reaching, and the area of concurrent power is
less expansive, than Rostow's account would have it.
Other scholars advance a somewhat different version of the "formal
war/shared power" view. John Yoo, for example, agrees that the Founders
meant to establish a flexible system of overlapping war powers, but, within
that structure, he interprets the President's war powers more expansively and
Congress's war powers more narrowly than Rostow. Yoo argues that
Congress's power to declare war should be understood as a largely formal
power to declare, usually after hostilities have already commenced, that a state
of total war exists-a declaration whose primary purpose is not to "authorize"
war but to clarify the rights and duties of U.S. citizens as well as foreigners
in time of war.79 Yoo further contends that the Founders largely embraced a
("Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or congress may wage a limited war; limited in place,
in objects, and in time.").
77. See Rostow, supra note 64, at 842, 847, 850-51, 864-66.
78. See supra note I and accompanying text.
79. See Yoo, supra note 63, at 242-50, 295; see also Bobbitt, supra note 63, at 1375-76 ("Textually,
the one thing that the Declaration of War Clause cannot grant is the equivalent of the power to make war
with the tactical role removed, because a declaration of war only comes after war has commenced.").
Likewise, Yoo understands Congress's power to grant letters of marque and reprisal in a narrow technical
sense. See Yoo, supra note 63, at 250-52. Yoo's formalistic reading of the "declare War" and Marque and
Reprisal Clauses does not square, however, with the powerful evidence that the Founders understood
Congress to possess the power to decide whether the United States should initiate or commence war against
another state with which the United States was at peace, whether it be a declared war or simply "imperfect"
and limited hostilities. See supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text; infra notes 91-96 and accompanying
text; see also REVELEY, supra note 36, at 63--64; Lofgren, supra note 35, at 680-81, 684-85, 694-97.
Indeed, despite inserting the word "declare" in the Constitution, many Founders continued to use the words
"declare" and "make" interchangeably when referring to the war powers of Congress. Roger Sherman of
Connecticut, for example, wrote in a letter a few months after the Constitutional Convention that "[tihe
power of making war" is "vested in Congress." Letter from Roger Sherman to Unknown (Dec. 8, 1787),
in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 286, 288
(James H. Hutson ed., 1987). Justice William Patterson of New Jersey, a prominent Framer, likewise later
wrote in United States v. Smith, that "the power of making war... is exclusively vested in congress ......
27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342). Alexander Hamilton in 1798 referred to Congress
as "that Department which is to declare or make war." Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry,
supra note 52, at 462. Nor is Yoo's formalistic account fully consistent with the writings of major
international scholars known to the Founders, such as Vattel and Burlamaqui, who argued that a declaration
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Blackstonian view of executive power and intended the President to take the
"initiative in war," subject only to Congress's power over funding and
impeachment.80 While Yoo is right to emphasize the importance of
Congress's power of the purse as its most powerful tool in restraining
executive military action, his account is at odds with the ample evidence that
the Founders decided quite deliberately to change the British system by
transferring the power to initiate war (and not simply to formally "declare" it)
from the executive to the legislative branch, believing that such power should
not rest in the President's hands alone."' Yoo also pays insufficient attention
to the Founders' distinction between Congress's power to "commence" war
and the President's power to "repel" it-a distinction that both the classical
and "offensive/defensive war" originalist accounts rightly regard as central.8 2
Still others who advance a "formal war/shared power" view of original
intent regard the constitutional allocation of war powers as even more
fundamentally indeterminate than do Yoo or Rostow. 3 Admittedly, the
Constitution does leave much unsaid or unspecified in the broad realm of
foreign affairs, even as it gives Congress substantial power. t But the war
powers were allocated with more clarity, as the classical account
contends-convincingly, in my view. At the most general level, the Founders'
concern to ensure that no "one man" be able to initiate war, but that the
President be able to protect the country from attacks initiated by others, is hard
to miss. The existence of some areas of uncertainty does not call the entire
"classical" account into question.
While the "classical" view, in its essentials, is more persuasive than the
alternative accounts of original intent, my dialogue with nonclassicist scholars
and my study of the sources from the Founding have led me to a more
of war should precede the commencement of hostilities against an adversary because its pnmary purpose
was to avert bloodshed by giving the enemy once last chance to do justice. See Bt;RLAItAQUt. supra note
49, at 187-88; VATEL, supra note 49. at 315. 317.
80. See Yoo, supra note 63, at 174, 241.
81. See supra notes 23-26, 35-40. 46-52 and accompanying text; see also Turner. supra note 41. at
946-48.
82. Moreover, in drawing analogies to the powers of state governors, who were generally named
commanders in chief of state militias at the time of the Constitution's ratification. Yoo also understates the
constraints on their ability to initiate military action beyond defending against attacks and aggressions
initiated by others.
83. For example, Gary Born argues that beyond giving Congress the power to formally "declare" war
and making the President "Commander in Chief." the Founders intended no clear or unambiguous allocation
of war powers at all. They instead deliberately created a fluid and open-ended system of shared powers.
with regard both to foreign affairs and to war, that would allow the political branches to reach
accommodations as they saw fit in response to particular exigencies and historical circumstances. See
Constitutional War Powers Hearings, supra note 63, at 460. 482 (statement of Gary Born).
84. For a perceptive essay, drawing on the work of John Locke. that examines the inherent difficulty
facing the Founders of allocating and categorizing foreign affairs powers. see Nathan Tarcov. Principle.
Prudence, and the Constitutional Division of Foreign Policy, in FOREIGN POUCY AND TlE Co.NsTrruno.
20 (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds.. 1990). See also Jack N. Rakove, Making Foreign
Policy-The View from 1787. in FOREIGN POuCY AND THE CONSTTUTION. supra. at I (analyzing
Founders' expectation of Congress's preeminent role in foreign affairs).
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nuanced classical position than the strict classical account presented in Fisher's
book.85 Fisher argues, for example, that the Founders understood the
President's defensive war powers as extending only to repelling attacks "either
against the mainland of the United States or against American troops
abroad. ' 86 Yet the Founders said very little about the scope of the President's
authority to "repel sudden attacks," leaving no clear indication whether they
understood it to include repelling imminent as well as actual attacks against the
United States, or attacks against U.S. citizens and vessels abroad. 87 The
Constitution's only explicit textual grant of power to repel attacks went to the
states: They could not engage in war without Congress's consent "unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay." 88
It is completely plausible, in my view, that the Founders understood the
President to possess a comparable power to act defensively to thwart imminent
attacks upon the United States.89 Whether the Founders meant to empower
the President to rescue U.S. citizens under attack in a foreign country is not
clear; certainly they gave the power to authorize reprisals or other acts of war
to Congress. Yet some early presidents, such as Thomas Jefferson, viewed
themselves as having power "to protect our citizens from violence ... [and]
when necessary, to repel an inroad, or to rescue a citizen or his property. ''90
In short, I am not convinced, as Fisher seems to be, that the Founders
understood the President's own defensive powers to be limited so strictly to
repelling sudden attacks against the United States or its forces.
My best reading of the sources is that the Founders would have expected
the President as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to protect the
United States in a dangerous and uncertain world by repelling actual or
imminent attacks against the United States, its vessels, and its armed forces,
but not, on his own, to go beyond this authority and effectively change the
state of the nation from peace to war. Instead, "the organ intrusted with the
power to declare war, should first decide whether it is expedient to go to war,
or to continue in peace."9" On the other hand, if an enemy by its own actions
placed the United States in a state of war-by "declar[ing] or openly and
avowedly mak[ing] war upon the United States, 92 as by invading the
country-the President as Commander in Chief would be expected to exercise
85. My own view is particularly indebted to the thoughtful scholarship of SOFAER, supra note 39, and
WoRMUum & FIRMAGE, supra note 4.
86. FISHER, supra note 4, at 7, 11.
87. See SOFAER, supra note 39, at 57.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
89. See SOFAER, supra note 39, at 4; Thomas M. Franck, After the Fall: The New Procedural
Framework for Congressional Control over the War Power, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 605, 608 (1977).
90. SOFAER, supra note 39, at 200 n.* (quoting Jefferson); see also Raven-Hansen, supra note 56, at
37 (same).
91. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230-31 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
92. HAMILTON, supra note 60, at 249.
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the nation's fundamental right of self-defense.93 As James Madison explained:
"The only case in which the Executive can enter on a war, undeclared by
Congress, is when a state of war has 'been actually' produced by the conduct
of another power .... ,94 Even then, Madison emphasized, "it ought to be
made known as soon as possible to the Department charged with the war
power," as President Jefferson had done after Tripoli both declared and made
war against the United States.95 Moreover, "[ilf foreign danger merely
threatened and time for deliberation still remained," as Arthur Bestor explains,
"contemporaries never doubted that the power to determine on war belonged
to Congress as it had from the beginning of the Revolution. ' ' 6
One issue that neither the constitutional text nor the Founders clearly
addressed, however, was the question of constitutional authority over peacetime
troop deployments abroad-deployments in support of U.S. foreign policy that
did not involve commencing hostilities against a state with which the United
States was at peace. This power is best understood as a concurrent one.
Congress, after all, was given the constitutional power to raise, support,
maintain, and regulate the military forces,97 authority that reasonably can
encompass legislative restrictions on their overseas deployment. As a practical
matter, moreover, in the early Republic presidents needed to obtain legislation
from Congress to create a navy and an army in the first place. The President,
on the other hand, was expected to have primary responsibility for diplomacy
93. Early practice confirmed a distinction between the President's power to respond to limited "acts
of war" by an aggressor, such as an attack on a U.S. vessel or a seizure of a ship or sailor (which did not
necessarily give rise to a "state of war"), and the President's power to respond %hen a foreign nation
produced an actual state of war by "declarfing] or openly and avowedly maklingj %ar upon the United
States." Id. See generally Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1230-31 (discussing distinction): WO-t, Ui & FIR.%tAGE.
supra note 4, at 21-25 (same). If a foreign state initiated limited hostilities that did not amount to
commencing a de facto "state of war," the President could engage in acts of self-defense by "'epel(ling)
force by force." Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry, supra note 52. at 462. "Any thing
beyond this," wrote Hamilton, "must fall under the idea of reprisals & requires the sanction of that
Department which is to declare or make war." Id. If a foreign power, in contrast, actually commences war
against the United States, such as by invading U.S. territory. the enemy has already made the decision to
engage in war and the President as Commander in Chief could respond accordingly.
Years later, in the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court affirmed this theory of the President's authority
to respond defensively when a de facto state of war is produced, whether by foreign invaders or domestic
rebellion. The President, the Court wrote. "has no power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign
nation or a domestic State." 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635. 668 (1863) (emphasis added). But if war is thrust upon
the United States, "the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force." Id. The Supreme
Court thus upheld President Lincoln's unilateral naval blockade of the Confederacy because the President
did "not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative
authority." Id. Whether the insurrection rose to the level of a de facto war was a question for the President
to decide, the Court held, but it also pointed to objective indications that a state of war existed. The Court
noted that it could not ignore "the existence of a war, which all the %orld acknowledges to be the greatest
civil war known in the history of the human race .... " Id. at 669 (discussing fact that England and other
nations recognized Civil War's existence and had proclaimed neutrality).
94. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe. supra note 59. at 600
95. Id.
96. Bestor, supra note 40, at 612.
97. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14.
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with foreign nations,98 and peacetime deployments of military forces can be
a vital instrument of diplomacy.99 Beyond this, peacetime troop deployments
by the President can also deter and protect the United States from foreign
aggression and thus help to prevent war and preserve "the blessings of
peace"--a clear goal of the Founders.'0°  Historical practice and comity
between the branches have largely governed the question of troop deployments
in peacetime.'0 ' With these refinements, the "classical" view of the original
understanding still accords better with the historical evidence than the major
alternative accounts. But the Founders' understanding of war powers and the
purposes they sought to advance are only the starting point in understanding
the Constitution's meaning today.'° Also important is the way that
successive presidents and congresses have lived under the Constitution in the
more than two centuries since its ratification,' t 3 an issue to which Fisher
devotes the lion's share of his book. Indeed, given the relative scarcity of
judicial decisions addressing war powers, historical practice holds even greater
practical significance than it otherwise might.
98. Both Madison and Hamilton agreed on this point in their debate over President Washington's
declaration of neutrality. See supra notes 42, 62.
99. See, e.g., BARRY M. BLECHMAN & STEPHEN S. KAPLAN, FORCE WITHOUT WAR: U.S. ARMED
FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 1-4 (1978); Rostow, supra note 64, at 839, 890, 896.
100. See HAMILTON & MADISON, supra note I, at 14 (Alexander Hamilton).
101. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 310.
102. Whether the Founders' understanding of the Constitution should be our understanding today, and
how their animating purposes should be translated into our very different world are critical questions in
constitutional interpretation. I address some of these issues with regard to war powers in Part Ill. For a
helpful discussion of "translation" as a method of maintaining fidelity with the Constitution's original
meaning, see Lessig, supra note 22. On originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation in general,
see SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 96-113. For a discussion of the merits of originalism, see Perry, supra note
22, at 714-18. But see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 205-24 (1980) (discussing limitations of originalism). Although Brest is critical of originalist
approaches to constitutional interpretation, he nevertheless views "moderate originalism," which looks to
the Founders' basic purposes rather than their specific intentions, as a coherent but incomplete approach.
See id. at 223, 229, 231, 237-38. In addition, he argues that originalism should be given presumptive
weight in interpreting the Constitution. See id. at 237. For a perceptive critique of the dilemmas and
limitations of originalism, see TUSHNET, supra note 22, at 23-45. Tushnet does, however, suggest the
possibility of a "hermeneutic originalism," which would "lead us not to despair over the gulf that separates
the framers' world from ours but rather to the crafting of creative links between their ideals and our own."
Id. at 43-44. "The task," he continues, "is to think through the implications of our continued dedication
to the large abstractions when the particulars of the world have changed so drastically." Id. at 44.
103. James Madison, writing in 1830, stressed the importance of the "evils & defects" the Constitution
was designed to address, as well as the understandings of the document's ratifiers, in interpreting the
Constitution. See Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), in 9 THE WRmNOS OF JAMES
MADISON 370, 371-72 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). He also recognized the significance of historical practice:
That in a Constitution, so new, and so complicated, there should be occasional difficulties &
differences in the practical expositions of it, can surprize [sic] no one; and this must continue
to be the case, as happens to new laws on complex subjects, until a course of practice of
sufficient uniformity and duration to carry with it the public sanction shall settle doubtful or
contested meanings.
Id. at 372 (emphasis added). In stressing the role of consistent, continued practice sanctioned by the
American people, however, Madison cautioned against "constructions adapted on the spur of occasions, and
subject to the vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies." Id.
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II. HISTORICAL PRACTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
While executive-legislative practice since the Founding undoubtedly is
important in understanding the Constitution's meaning today, both the
substantive patterns and the normative significance of that practice remain
divisive issues in war powers scholarship. Not surprisingly, different attitudes
toward history are linked to differing views about original intent. Scholars who
take a broad view of presidential war powers tend to invoke history as largely
vindicating their approach, citing over two hundred instances in which
presidents allegedly have used force unilaterally.'04 Those who take the
"classical" view also see history as largely consistent with their position, at
least until the Korean War and the subsequent Cold War period.'05 Is there
any common ground? What patterns emerge from history, and what is their
normative significance? After reviewing Fisher's substantive account of
historical practice, I will turn to these hard questions and offer my own view,
which charts a middle course within the broad spectrum of views about the
constitutional significance of historical practice.
A. The Patterns of History
Fisher devotes six of the nine chapters of his book to a historical survey
of congressional-presidential practice regarding the commitment of U.S. forces
to hostilities from 1789 to 1995. In each chapter, he focuses on the question
of the President's legal authority to take the military actions in question.
Fisher's overarching concern is to determine the extent to which presidents and
congresses lived up to the original expectation that the legislative branch
authorize the initiation of war, on whatever scale.
What patterns emerge from Fisher's historical survey? Most notably, for
the first few decades after the Constitution's ratification-while the Founding
generation held the reins of power-and throughout most of the nineteenth
century as well, presidents acted consistent with the original understanding that
"[t]he decision to go to war or to mount offensive actions was reserved to
Congress."' 6 President George Washington, for example, took defensive
measures to protect frontier inhabitants from various Native American tribes
after Congress authorized him to call up the militia for this purpose.""
Washington did not view himself as possessing authority to go beyond this and
undertake an offensive expedition unless Congress specifically authorized such
104. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 43. at 23.
105. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 6, at 10.
106. FISHER, supra note 4, at 13.
107. See id. at 13-15.
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action.' President John Adams sought congressional authorization for the
quasi-war with France from 1798 to 1800, and Congress obliged by enacting
numerous statutes supporting military action by the President."° President
Thomas Jefferson took measures to protect the United States and its vessels
from attacks initiated by others, most notably the Barbary powers, but he
viewed Congress's approval as essential for "offensive" military actions."'
President James Madison, in the events leading up to the War of 1812 with
Great Britain, sought legislation from Congress to augment the U.S. armed
forces, and Congress subsequently formally declared war for the first time in
U.S. history."' Congress in 1815, however, declined Madison's request for
a declaration of war against Algiers, choosing instead to authorize more limited
military action at sea.
112
By the mid-1800s, however, with more substantial military forces now at
their disposal, presidents became more assertive in using military force. In
1846, President James Polk essentially precipitated war with Mexico by
deploying U.S. troops into disputed territory along the Texas-Mexico border,
triggering a Mexican military response.' Polk then sought and obtained a
declaration of war from Congress, but many legislators criticized the President
for stimulating the war." 4 In 1861, at the beginning of the Civil War,
President Abraham Lincoln unilaterally ordered a blockade against the seceding
states and suspended the writ of habeas corpus while Congress was in
108. See id. at 15. In 1793, Washington proclaimed American neutrality in the war between Britain
and France, but he asked Congress to endorse that position and to enact legislation prohibiting violations
by private citizens. See id. at 20-22.
109. See id. at 17-18.
110. See id. at 26-27. After Congress authorized a "naval peace establishment" in 1801, Jefferson sent
a squadron to the Mediterranean with orders to protect U.S. commerce and "chastise" the Barbary powers
in the event they declared war against the United States. See id. at 24-25. American forces took action,
however, only after Tripoli had both declared war against America and attacked U.S. vessels. Jefferson,
moreover, sought Congress's authorization for "offensive" military action against the Barbary powers. In
other conflicts during his administration, Jefferson likewise was careful not to go beyond defensivc
operations without congressional sanction. See id. at 25-27. While Jefferson believed that the country's self-
preservation, in cases of absolute necessity, would take precedence over the written law, Fisher contends
that Jefferson viewed such situations as limited to "emergencies that threatened the survival of the nation,
after which he would seek congressional approval." Id. at 27.
111. See id. at 28-29.
112. See id. at 27-28. That Congress was the body with the power to commence war or initiate
hostilities, whether declared or undeclared, was a view shared not only by presidents and congresses; it also
was affirmed by the courts in numerous judicial decisions of the early Republic, including those growing
out of the undeclared war with France. As Justice Chase wrote in 1800, "Congress is empowered to declare
a general war, or congress may wage a limited war; limited in place, in objects, and in time." Bas v. Tingy,
4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 37, 43 (1800) (Chase, J.). The Supreme Court also held that statutory limits imposed by
Congress in authorizing hostilities took precedence over contrary orders from the President. See FIStHER,
supra note 4, at 19 (discussing Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) [170], 179 (1804)).
113. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 31-32.
114. Among his critics was Representative Abraham Lincoln, who wrote that the Framers designed
the Constitution so that "no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression (war] upon us."
Letter from Abraham Lincoln to William H. Herndon, supra note 31, at 452.
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recess. n 5 "Aside from Polk's initiatives in Mexico and Lincoln's emergency
actions during the Civil War," concludes Fisher, "the power of war in the
nineteenth century remained basically in the hands of Congress."
'1 6
Moreover, neither "exception" represented a repudiation of the constitutional
scheme: Not even Polk claimed legal authority to commence war against
Mexico, and Lincoln sought retrospective authorization from Congress for his
emergency measures responding to internal rebellion.
If "war" is understood as initiating hostilities against a sovereign state,
Fisher's conclusion regarding the nineteenth century seems correct. Practice
during that period was a bit more complicated, however, with respect to a
range of limited uses of force directed primarily at entities other than
governments. Fisher's account of the years from 1789 to 1900 focuses
primarily on major military conflicts; he says little about the many smaller-
scale military operations undertaken by U.S. forces during this time. Yet, as
other scholars have documented," 7 U.S. forces in the nineteenth century
engaged in numerous and diverse small-scale military actions, sometimes on
the order of the President, sometimes on the order of individual military
commanders. Examples include "police" actions in pursuit of pirates and
bandits, and limited naval landings on foreign coasts to protect American
citizens in situations of instability and risk, some of which were authorized by
statute."5 Fisher, to be sure, emphasizes that presidents (during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries) sent U.S. troops abroad on many occasions
"to protect American life and property. '' "9 But by highlighting the notorious
bombing of Greytown, Nicaragua in 1854'20 (which involved an extreme and
much-criticized reprisal in response to an affront to an American diplomat)' 2'
and neglecting the more representative naval landings, Fisher leaves the
impression that virtually all the military actions undertaken to protect
115. Lincoln, however, acted in an emergency situation of internal rebellion and he sought (and
obtained) retroactive authorization from Congress. See FISHER. supra note 4. at 38-39 Lincoln explained
that the actions he had taken, "'whether strictly legal or not. were ventured upon under what appeared to
be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusung then. as now, that Congress would readily ratify
them."' Id. at 38 (quoting 7 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF TIHE PRESIDENTIS.
1789-1897, at 3225 (James D. Richardson ed.. n.p., U.S. Cong. 1898)). In the Prize Cases. the Supreme
Court upheld Lincoln's defensive naval blockade. See supra note 93.
116. FISHER, supra note 4, at 41.
117. See, e.g., HENRY BARTHOLOMEW Cox. 2 WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS. AND CONSTrTT"IONAL POWER
51-63, 299-331 (1984); SCHLESINGER, supra note 4. at 50-54: WORMLVTH & FIR.MAGE. supra note 4. at
145-63; Raven-Hansen, supra note 56, at 37-39.
118. Congress authorized naval operations against pirates in 1819 See Ra%en-Hansen. supra note 56.
at 38-39. In 1862 Congress authorized the Secretary of the Navy to make regulations governing naval
landings to protect Americans at risk abroad. See WORt.MLrrH & FIR.IAGE. supra note 4. at 156-60
119. FISHER, supra note 4, at 35.
120. See id. at 35-36, 46.
121. That incident, Arthur Schlesinger explains, was regarded as an embarrassing and unfortunate
mistake by virtually everyone at the time. and the court that upheld it stretched the facts in order to do so
See SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 55-56.
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Americans abroad were pretextual and illegitimate.122 A fuller and more
differentiated account of past actions to protect and rescue Americans abroad
would provide a sounder historical basis for assessing presidential claims of
such authority today.
If practice during the nineteenth century was largely faithful to the original
understanding of war powers, the Constitution came under strain at the turn of
the century, Fisher argues, as the United States became a global power'23
In a chapter entitled America Steps Out: 1900 to 1945, Fisher shows how
presidents during the first half of the twentieth century began to assert power
to commit U.S. forces to hostilities abroad without congressional authorization,
particularly against comparatively weak states in the Caribbean and Latin
America. Examples include Theodore Roosevelt's intervention in Colombia in
1903 to secure control of the Panama canal, William Howard Taft's
interventions in Nicaragua beginning in 1906, and Woodrow Wilson's decision
in 1915 to occupy Haiti.t2" When the United States went to war against
European powers in the first half of the twentieth century, in contrast,
presidents sought declarations of war from Congress. Fisher discusses how
both President Woodrow Wilson prior to America's entry into World War I
and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt prior to entry into World War II took
actions that moved the country decisively toward war. In the face of the
Neutrality Acts in the 1930s, for example, Roosevelt set the stage for U.S.
entry into war through his "destroyers for bases" deal with Britain, his
commitment of U.S. forces to Greenland and Iceland, and his authorization of
military action against German submarines in the Atlantic. Yet neither Wilson
nor Roosevelt claimed authority to commit the United States to war without
Congress's approval.
The Korean conflict inaugurated a different pattern. President Harry S
Truman did not seek congressional authorization either before or after he sent
American forces into combat to repel North Korea's invasion of South
Korea. t25 Fisher views Korea as a turning point in the assertion of war
122. Military actions to protect "American life and property," contends Fisher, have been based "not
on legislative authority," FISHER, supra note 4, at 35, but rather on claims of executive authority, and they
"always served some larger purpose of American foreign policy," id. at 46. Fisher does discuss the 1868
"Hostage Act," however, which authorizes the President to use such means "not amounting to acts of war"
as he deems necessary to obtain release of Americans being wrongfully deprived of their liberty by a
foreign government. See id. at 37; see also Raven-Hansen, supra note 56, at 39-40.
123. As a result of the Spanish-American War, declared by Congress in 1898, the United States
emerged as a world power with interests in the Pacific as well as the Caribbean. See FISHER, supra note
4, at 41-45. Spain ceded the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam to the United States at the war's
conclusion.
124. More extended analysis of these early twentieth-century cases would have been helpful. Fisher
mentions several of the interventions only briefly (e.g., William Howard Taft's intervention in Honduras
and Cuba, see id. at 49, and Woodrow Wilson's intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, see id.
at 51-52), leaving the reader without a full sense of the legal authority invoked by presidents for deploying
U.S. forces or the reactions to the presidents' claims in Congress.
125. Congress did, however, enact legislation appropriating funds for Korea, see Stromseth, supra note
7, at 630, and extending the draft, see id. at 626. Fisher strongly criticizes Truman for relying on UN
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powers by presidents,'2 and in fundamental ways it was. Although trends of
increasing presidential war power were already well in place earlier in the
twentieth century, 27 Korea represented a significant expansion in presidential
claims of authority. Truman asserted power as Commander in Chief to send
U.S. forces into combat on a major scale, without congressional authorization,
to protect "'the broad interests of American foreign policy'--including
preserving the effectiveness of the United Nations and responding to threats
to the UN Charter as they arose.'2 More generally, Fisher discusses how a
growing array of U.S. global commitments, reflected in various mutual security
treaties, led presidents to view themselves as possessing broad authority to use
force in defense of American interests and allies around the world. 29
Truman's expansive conception of presidential war power was not shared
by all of his successors in the White House, however. In fact, the one
professional soldier who has served as President in recent times, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, understood the importance of congressional approval when
American soldiers are asked to risk their lives in combat for their country.
During his tenure in office, Eisenhower stated, there would be "'no
involvement of America in war unless it is a result of the constitutional
Security Council resolutions as a basis for committing U.S. troops to battle. Fisher stresses, among other
things, that Truman ordered U.S. naval and air forces into combat before the Security Council had formally
authorized military action, and that the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA) of 1945 was premised
on congressional approval of U.S. military commitments to the Unted Nations. See FISHER. supra note 4,
at 80-81, 84-88. Truman's action was, as Fisher contends. in tension with the clear expectation of
legislative-executive collaboration that informed the Senate's approval of the United Nations Charter and
Congress's adoption of the UNPA. See Stromseth. supra note 7. at 604-06. 614-18 Fisher goes too far.
however, when he claims that Truman's action "violated the UN Charter." FISHER. supra note 4. at 88. and
the "unambiguous statutory language ... of the UN Participation Act." id. at 84-85 On the contrary.
Truman's decision to send U.S. forces to Korea was fully consistent with the Secunty Council's earlier
resolution calling on member states for assistance in Korea. and diplomatic soundings indicated that the
Council would soon explicitly authorize military actions to repel the attack as well. See Stromseth. supra
note 7, at 624-25. Moreover, while the UNPA requires that "special agreements" committing U.S forces
to the United Nations be approved by Congress in advance, the statute does not prohibit the commitment
of U.S. forces by the President in individual cases in the absence of a special agreement The authonty of
the President to commit forces in such cases would depend on the circumstances and on the scope of the
President's constitutional power to repel attacks. In short, the constitutional default rules sould apply
Nevertheless. I agree with Fisher's more specific conclusion that Truman vas constitutionally required to
obtain Congress's authorization, as soon as possible, for his commitment of U.S. forces to combat in Korea.
See id. at 638-39, 660-64.
126. See FISHER, supra note 4. at 100-01 (quoting STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
82D CONG., BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES I (Comm. Print 1951)).
127. See NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT. supra note 9. at 14-15: see also id at 31 ("Only in the
[twentieth] century have Presidents used the Armed Forces of the United States against foreign govemnments
entirely on their own authority, and only since 1950 have Presidents regarded themscels as having
authority to commit the Armed Forces to full-scale and sustained warfare.")
128. See Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea. DEP'T ST BLuLL. July 3. 1950. at
173, 174, 176-77. This State Department memorandum did not invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter or the
concept of collective self-defense.
129. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 92-101. 187-88. American secunty, in short, increasingly was
understood in global terms: A threat anywhere in the world might affect U.S. national secunty. The sensc
of emergency that pervaded the Cold War period reinforced this view. See SCHLESINGER. supra note 4. at
163-65.
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process that is placed upon Congress to declare it.""' t30 When the Chinese
Communists threatened Formosa in 1955, Eisenhower sought authorization
from Congress for possible U.S. military action. He likewise sought a
resolution in 1957 in response to communist threats in the Middle East. Fisher
commends Eisenhower, quite properly, for his appreciation both of the
constitutional need for, and practical benefits of, obtaining congressional
approval before committing U.S. forces to combat.' 3' Yet the broad "area
resolutions" passed by Congress in 1955 and 1957-important statements of
resolve and cooperation on the part of Congress and the President-also
delegated enormous power to the President to decide whether or not force was
necessary. 1
32
The war powers role of Congress declined significantly, Fisher argues,
during the administrations of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon.
t33
Congressional deference to the President during the 1950s and 1960s
culminated in the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, an open-ended
congressional delegation of power modeled after the 1957 Middle East
Resolution. Adopted after only limited debate and based on information
130. FISHER, supra note 4, at 104 (quoting Eisenhower news conference). Fisher notes that Eisenhower
viewed covert operations differently and was willing to act unilaterally in that area. See id. at 104, 169.
131. See id. at 103-04, 110-i1.
132. In that respect, they represented a diminution in the real participation of Congress in decisions
to use force. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 159-63; JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND
RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 114-16 (1981). The Formosa Resolution authorized the President "to employ
the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary" in defense of Formosa and other territories
in the area. Joint Resolution of Jan. 29, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-4, 69 Stat. 7, 7, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app.
at 12,269 (1970) (repealed 1974). The 1957 Middle East resolution stated that "if the President determines
the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces" to assist Middle Eastern nations
"against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism .... 22 U.S.C. §
1962 (1994). When Eisenhower subsequently deployed 5000 U.S. marines to Lebanon in 1958 (after
consulting with congressional leaders), debate ensued over whether that deployment fell within the terms
of the 1957 resolution. See H. Doc. No. 85-422 (1958) (Eisenhower's message to Congress); 104 CONG.
REc. 14,548 (1958) (remarks of Vice President Nixon); Felix Belair Jr., Eisenhower Sends Marines into
Lebanon; President Says More Troops Will Go if They Are Needed, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1958, at 1; Arthur
Krock, Law and Intervention, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1958, at 8.
133. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 111-25. Fisher sharply criticizes President Kennedy for taking
military action without congressional authorization during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but members of
Congress did not share these criticisms at the time. At the beginning of the missile crisis (probably the most
dangerous emergency to threaten the United States during the Cold War era), Congress passed a resolution
to express the nation's determination "to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported
military capability endangering the security of the United States." Joint Resolution of Oct. 3, 1962, Pub,
L. No. 87-733, 76 Stat. 697, 697. While the Resolution did not expressly authorize the use of force, almost
all the members of Congress who spoke during the accompanying congressional debate indicated that they
believed the President should make the critical decisions about how best to respond to the threat. See, e.g.,
108 CONG. REc. 20,027 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Saltonstall) ("The main purpose of the resolution is to
indicate.., that the people of the United States are actively supporting the President of the United States
in whatever action he deems it necessary to take .... "); id. at 20,033 (statement of Sen. Cooper) ("[The
greatest meaning and value of the resolution is to back up the President of the United States in whatever
action he may deem it advisable to take."); id. at 20,877 (remarks of Rep. Selden) ("[M]ost will agree that
[the resolution] represents congressional recognition of the need for action and our support of the President
in any efforts he may make to meet this need."); see also id. at 20,901 (statement of Rep. Stratton) ("This
resolution makes it clear that this House will firmly support the President in whatever action he does
take."); id. at 20,880 (remarks of Rep. Ellsworth) (expressing similar support).
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subsequently shown to be highly suspect,'3 the Tonkin Gulf Resolution
declared that the United States was "prepared, as the President determines, to
take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member
or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting
assistance in defense of its freedom."' 35 President Johnson, not surprisingly,
read the Resolution as broad authority to expand U.S. military operations in
Vietnam.136 President Nixon later secretly expanded the war to Cambodia,
without congressional authorization or even notification, and he resisted
subsequent congressional efforts to limit American military involvement in
Southeast Asia.
Congress's willingness to tolerate broad presidential control over matters
of war and peace did not last forever, however. Gradually, as dissent over the
Vietnam War mounted, many members of Congress came to regret their
abdication of a more active and discerning role in decisions to commit U.S.
forces abroad. Fisher examines the gradual resurgence of Congress from the
1969 National Commitments Resolution, to the subsequent cut-off of funds for
the war in Indochina, to the adoption of the War Powers Resolution in 1973
over President Nixon's veto. In a separate chapter, Fisher documents
Congress's gradual assumption of greater oversight for covert operations.
Fisher brings his historical survey to a close in a chapter that examines
two decades of U.S. military actions spanning the Ford to Clinton
administrations. These include President Carter's aborted attempt to rescue
U.S. hostages in Iran; President Reagan's intervention in Grenada and bombing
of Libya; President Bush's intervention in Panama and his commitment (with
congressional authorization) of U.S. forces to the Gulf War; and President
Clinton's deployment of U.S. combat forces to Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.
During this period, Fisher argues, the War Powers Resolution has served as a
limited constraint on presidents-not over the initial decision to commit forces
unilaterally but instead on the duration of the military involvement: "'Even if
the clock does not tick on the sixty-to-ninety-day deadline, executive officials
behave as though it does. Military operations in Grenada and Panama were
conducted as though the sixty-day limit was enforceable-if not legally, then
politically."' 37 At the same time, Fisher is critical of the tendency of
presidents in recent years to provide only last-minute notice to Congress and
engage in cursory consultations before committing American forces
abroad. 38 Fisher asserts that in only one case since World War II-President
134. See FISHER, supra note 4. at 116-17.
135. Joint Resolution of Aug. 10. 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408. § 2. 78 Stat. 384. 384, repnrnted in 50
U.S.C. app. at 9499 (1964) (repealed 1971).
136. For a trenchant analysis of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and subsequent congressional actions with
regard to the war in Indochina, see ELY, supra note 6. at 15-46. 75-76.
137. FISHER, supra note 4, at 133.
138. See id. at 161, 185.
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Ford's evacuation of U.S. citizens and foreign nationals from Vietnam-was
the President justified in acting "in the absence of congressional
authority."'' 39 More generally, he contends that "[t]he framers' design,
deliberately placing in Congress the decision to expend the nation's blood and
treasure, has been radically transformed" since World War II.1
4
0
B. The Normative Significance of History
Fisher's overview of executive-legislative practice under the Constitution
raises a fundamental question: Should we understand the Constitution's
division of war powers between Congress and the President any differently
today in light of this historical practice? After devoting the majority of his
book to history, Fisher says surprisingly little about this crucial issue. Fisher,
to be sure, rejects the argument that history has given or can give the President
the power to initiate "war" without congressional authorization. 4' Beyond
this fundamental point, however, Fisher does not explore in any depth whether
historical practice has something to teach us about how to understand the
constitutional allocation of war powers in the late twentieth century. This is a
missed opportunity both because Fisher's historical research puts him in a good
position to address the question of history's significance with more subtlety,
and because arguments based on historical practice are so central to
contemporary war powers debates.
Presidents and their advisers regularly invoke historical practice as a means
of validating presidential power to commit U.S. forces to hostilities. Before the
Persian Gulf War, for instance, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney appealed
to history in arguing that President Bush did not need congressional approval
to send American troops into battle against Iraq: "[I]n the more than 200 times
that U.S. military force has been committed over the history of the Nation,
there are only five occasions in which the Congress of the United States voted
a prior declaration of war."' 142 Likewise, scholars who contend that the
139. Id. at 186. By analyzing all post-Vietnam interventions in only one brief chapter, Fisher inevitably
ignores some important nuances, particularly in the recent cases of U.S. military involvement in Somalia
and Bosnia. The efforts of Congress early in the Clinton Administration to authorize U.S. military
operations in Somalia go unmentioned, see Jane E. Stromseth, Collective Force and Constitutional
Responsibility: War Powers in the Post-Cold War Era, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 145, 168-69 (1995), as does
Congress's enactment of statutory language that implicitly accepted a U.S. military role in protecting "safe
haven" and "no-fly" zones in Bosnia, see Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-139, § 8146, 107 Stat. 1418, 1474 (1993) (allowing for use of funds for operations initiated on or
before October 20, 1993, including provision of humanitarian assistance).
140. FISHER, supra note 4, at 185.
141. See id. at 191.
142. Crisis in the Persian Gulf. Sanctions, Diplomacy and War: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Armed Services, 10 1st Cong. 589 (1990) [hereinafter Persian Gulf Hearings] (statement of Richard
Cheney, Secretary of Defense). President Clinton, in deploying U.S. forces to Haiti without congressional
authorization, likewise argued that he was simply following the historical practice of his predecessors who
committed U.S. forces to Panama and Grenada without congressional approval. See President William J.
Clinton, President's News Conference with President Jimmy Carter, General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam
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President has broad unilateral authority to commit U.S. forces to combat appeal
to the pattern of history. The "historical development of our institutions has
settled the legitimacy of 'inherent' presidential power to commit the armed
forces to hostilities," Henry Monaghan argues.14 3 "A practice so deeply
embedded in our governmental structure should be treated as decisive of the
constitutional issue."' 44
Arguments invoking historical practice play such a central role in modern
debates over war powers in part because so few judicial decisions (or at least
so few recent ones)'45 exist in this area. "Lawyers like to reason by means
of precedents," notes one scholar, "and nonjudicial precedents seem to be
better than no precedents at all."' 4 6 But is historical practice authoritative in
determining the respective constitutional war powers of Congress and the
President, and, if so, why and with what qualifications? These questions, not
surprisingly, elicit quite different responses from the various war powers
scholars who have addressed them, responses that fall at various points along
a wide spectrum.
At one end of that spectrum are those strict classicists, like Fisher, who
view the original understanding of the Constitution as so clear that history has
little to add or teach us. Their focus is primarily to judge the consistency of
historical practice with the original understanding of war powers, and they
view appeals to historical practice by proponents of executive power primarily
as attempts to amend the Constitution by usage. 7 At the other end of the
spectrum are those, like Henry Monaghan, who argue that history is all-
important and that the original understanding matters little, if at all.'
Nunn on Haiti, 1994 PUB. PAPERS 1574. 1576 (Sept. 19. 1994) [hereinafter Haiti N'ess Conference]
Executive branch lawyers, moreover, must regularly render opinions regarding the President's authonty to
commit U.S. forces to hostilities in concrete situations, and much of thear nalysis involves charactenzing
past practice and assessing its relevance for current decisions. See. e.g.. Letter from Walter Dellinger.
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel. to Senators Robert Dole. Alan K. Sampson. Strom
Thurmond, and William S. Cohen (Sept. 27. 1994). in 89 AM. J. INTr*L L. 122 (1995) [hereinafter OLC
Haiti Opinion].
143. Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential lVar-Making. 50 B.U. L. REv. 19. 31 (Special Issue 1970).
144. Id. For some additional examples of scholars who emphasize the importance of hastoncal practice.
see Emerson, supra note 43, at 39-42, W. Michael Reisman, W7r Powers" The Operational Code of
Competence, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 777, 782-84 (1989). and Peter J. Spiro. War Posters and the Sirens of
Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1338, 1355-64 (1993) (book review).
145. The courts played a more substantial role in addressing the respective war powers of Congress
and the President in the early years of our history, a contrast that Fisher underscores. See FISHER. supra
note 4, at 18-20, 22-24, 34-36, 38; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Judicial Constraints: The Courts and
War Powers, in THE U.S. CONSITImON AND THE POWER TO Go To WAR. supra note 56. at 121. 128 n 7.
146. Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A
Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHi. L. REv. 463, 478 (1976); see also Spiro. supra note 144. at 1355 ("It is
rather the 'court of history,' an accretion of interactions among the branches, that gives nse to basic norms
governing the branches' behavior in the [war powers) area.").
147. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, WVar.Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L R.Ev. 29. 54-58 (1972)
(criticizing notion of constitutional "adaptation by usage").
148. See Monaghan, supra note 143, at 21; see also Reisman, supra note 144 (emphasizing importance
of "operational code of competence" reflected in historical practice and deemphasizing importance of
original understanding).
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Whatever the Founders may have intended, Monaghan argues, today "the
military machine has simply become an instrument for achieving presidential
foreign policy objectives."'' 49 Monaghan is unconcerned whether historical
practice is consistent with the Founders' intent in allocating the war powers as
they did, although he does contend that his view of the President's historically
accrued war-making power is not "inconsistent" with the text or structure of
the Constitution.1
5 0
Between these poles are those scholars, like myself, who care about the
Founders' original understanding of war powers-particularly at the level of
basic animating purposes-but who view that understanding as open-ended in
at least some respects and thus give some weight to history as a basis for
interpreting the constitutional allocation of war powers today.
Methodologically, scholars in this group agree that history cannot simply
preempt the original understanding and principles reflected in the
Constitution-for good reason, as John Ely explains: "The most archaic-
sounding provisions of our founding document, their purposes intelligently
unpacked, generate commands of complete contemporary relevance."' 5'1 But
because these scholars differ dramatically over how open-ended the original
understanding of war powers is, they also differ in their view of the meaning
and significance of historical practice. Those who adhere to the "formal
war/shared power" account of the original understanding, for example, view
the Constitution as establishing only broad markers in a large area of
concurrent power. They thus tend not to focus upon identifying specific
patterns or categorizing cases but instead draw more general conclusions from
history. Most broadly, for instance, they argue that the diverse accommodations
between congresses and presidents over the course of American history are
149. Monaghan, supra note 143, at 31; see also id. at 27.
150. See id. at 32; see also id. at 21-22.
151. ELY, supra note 6, at 5. Ely shares the classical view of the original understanding; but even war
powers scholars who interpret the Constitution and the Founders' original understanding differently still
view that understanding as placing limits on what the President can claim today by virtue of historical
practice. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 43, at 60 (recognizing that President cannot initiate offensive war);
id. at 41 ("[R]epeated violation of the Constitution cannot make constitutional what was once
unconstitutional .... ). Robert Turner also recognizes limits on modem presidential war powers based on
his "offensive/defensive war" account of original intent. See Turner, supra note 41, at 920 n.76. John Yoo,
given his view of the original understanding, holds that advocates of broad presidential war power can have
their history and their originalism too. See Yoo, supra note 63, at 175. Eugene Rostow looks not to the
specific intent of the Founders but to the broad goals reflected in the Constitution:
We should not be trying to guide the evolution of our constitutional practice closer to what we
imagine to be "the classic intent" of the Founding Fathers. Even if we could define that
goal--and we cannot-it would not in itself be a relevant or appropriate objective for policy.
The policy goals of the Constitution--effective government and democratic
responsibility-should of course continue to govern the growth of our constitutional law of
foreign relations. That is the essence of the process through which any body of law grows. ...
The problem facing the nation is to fashion and refashion the Presidency and Congress as
responsible and cooperative institutions capable of carrying out a foreign policy adequate to the
security needs of our times and of the foreseeable future. That is an entirely different matter.
Rostow, supra note 63, at 48-49.
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both "rooted in the nature of things"' 52 and also "result[] directly from the
Framers' conscious design."' 3
If the Constitution's allocation of war powers were as open-ended as the
"formal war/shared power" view contends, historical practice-including the
varying accommodations reached by diverse presidents and
congresses-probably would be the best guide to understanding the respective
war powers of Congress and the President. However, because I think the
refined classical view of the original understanding accords better with the
sources from the Founding, I see a less expansive role for history in limited
areas of uncertainty and ambiguity. Yet, as I will explain below, I also believe
that Fisher's strict classical view gives too little weight to history as a basis for
understanding the President's constitutional war powers.
1. Judging History
Fisher largely rejects appeals to historical practice as a basis for
interpreting presidential war powers more broadly today than in 1789. He
acknowledges that both Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, in their concurrences
in the Youngstown case,' recognized that practice and custom may have an
impact on constitutional power. As Frankfurter wrote:
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot
supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the
words of a text or supply them. It is an inadmissibly narrow
conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words
of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written
upon them. In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold
the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the
structure of our government, may be treated asa gloss on "executive
Power" vested in the President by § 1 of Art. IV .
Jackson, in his famous tripartite analysis, wrote that "there is a zone of
twilight" in which the President and Congress have concurrent power or the
distribution of power is uncertain, and in which "congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence" may "enable, if not invite, measures on
152. Rostow, supra note 64, at 864; see also Rostow. supra note 63. at 10. 16
153. Yoo, supra note 63, at 305; see also Constitutonal War Powers Hearings. supra note 63. at 501
(statement of Gary Born).
154. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invahdating President Truman's
seizure of steel factories during Korean War).
155. Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter J., concurring).
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independent presidential responsibility."'156 Fisher contends, however, that
these seemingly "innocent" observations provide an incentive for "presidential
raids of power, done with the knowledge that the additional power seized will
be successful and permanent unless Congress effectively defends itself."' 57
While struggles between Congress and the President were an expected part of
the constitutional system of checks and balances, Fisher argues, "[p]residential
acts of war can never be accepted as constitutional or as a legal substitute for
congressional approval."'' 58 In other words, because the constitutional text
and original understanding clearly indicate that the power to initiate war
belongs to Congress, the President by practice cannot acquire that power.
"Illegal and unconstitutional actions, no matter how often repeated, do not
build a lawful foundation," he stresses.' 59
Fisher's basic point is surely right. As the Supreme Court has made clear
in other contexts, "It]hat an unconstitutional action has been taken before
surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later
date."' 6 Because I share Fisher's "classical" view that the Constitution and
the basic purposes it reflects clearly give Congress the power to commence
war, I also share his conclusion that the President cannot, by virtue of
historical practice, appropriate that power.'16 To argue otherwise would be
to claim, in effect, that the President alone or with congressional acquiescence
can "amend" the Constitution in contravention of the document's explicit
amendment provisions. Yet where the constitutional text is genuinely
ambiguous or silent, as it is regarding issues such the President's power as
Commander in Chief to deploy forces abroad for foreign policy purposes in
peacetime or the precise scope of the President's authority to "repel sudden
attacks," longstanding and consistent historical practice can shed light on how
we should understand the President's constitutional power today.
Fisher, to be sure, rightly criticizes those who invoke indiscriminately an
historical laundry list to claim broad presidential power to commence hostilities
even on a major scale. 62 The more than two hundred cases often cited as
156. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Any test of power in this area, he continued, "is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
law." Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
157. FISHER, supra note 4, at 191.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969) (arguing that even consistent congressional
practice of excluding congresspersons would not make exclusion of Rep. Adam Clayton Powell
constitutional); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down legislative veto as violation
of Constitution's lawmaking requirements, notwithstanding its inclusion in 196 different statutes in previous
half-century).
161. See also ELY, supra note 6, at 9-10. As previously noted, even war powers scholars who interpret
the Founders' original understanding differently still view it as constraining what the President can claim
from historical practice. See supra note 151.
162. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 188. To reach any sound conclusions, as Fisher correctly contends,
"[w]e need to examine the specific instances" and scrutinize with care the actions taken and the claimed
authority for those actions. Id.
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establishing a "practice of presidential 'war-making,'',163 vary tremendously
in scope and significance. "4 Almost seventy of the cases, for instance,
involved small, relatively low-risk, and self-contained naval landings to protect
or rescue American nationals overseas, which are a far cry from committing
U.S. forces to a major and sustained combat operation.'65 At least eight of
the cases involved limited military actions against pirates. '6 Many of the
cases on the lists, moreover, were in fact authorized by Congress by statute or
were taken pursuant to regulations authorized by statute. 6 7 The lists do not
include cases in which presidents refrained from using force because they
knew Congress would oppose it or because they were unsuccessful in
obtaining congressional authorization. Nor do the lists generally examine
whether Congress was presented with a fait accompli that made it practically
impossible for it to object or whether Congress protested the action after the
fact. In sum, the lists themselves do not tell the whole story.
While Fisher is properly critical of those who invoke these "two hundred
cases" to make broad claims of presidential war power without adequately
differentiating among them, he commits a similar error in reverse. He himself
indiscriminately lumps the cases together in categorically dismissing their
current relevance. In his words:
Defenders of presidential war power point to more than two hundred
instances in which Presidents have used military force without an
authorization from Congress. Those actions were minor adventures
done in the name of protecting American lives or property, taken at
a time when U.S. intervention in neighboring countries was
considered routine and proper. Today, such invasions violate
international law and regional treaties. 6s
Fisher's description is apt for some of the cases, but as other scholars have
shown, the instances of unilateral presidential military action are far more
diverse than he suggests. The more updated lists, for example, include not only
the U.S. interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean during the early
163. Monaghan, supra note 143, at 31.
164. For an illuminating discussion of attempts to catalogue instances of unilateral cxccutivc action.
see WORMtJTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 4, at 135-51. See also EI.IFN C. COLLIER. I.'STANCES OF USE OF
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD. 1798-1989 (Congressional Research Serv. No. 89-651 F. Dec.
4, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 CRS REPORT]; ELLEN C. COLLIER, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNIED STATES
ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-1993 (Congressional Research Serv. No. 93-890 F. Oct. 7. 1993)
[hereinafter 1993 CRS REPORT]. Some of these supposedly unilateral actions were in fact authorized by
Congress. See WORMuTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 4, at 153-60 (discussing naval landings approved by
Congress). While relatively few of the cases involved major or sustained combat operations, a number of
the twentieth-century interventions included sometimes prolonged excursions in the Caribbean and Central
America. See id. at 146.
165. See WORMUTr & FIRMAGE, supra note 4. at 145-46.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 144-45; Raven-Hansen, supra note 56. at 38-39.
168. FISHER, supra note 4, at 188.
1996]
The Yale Law Journal
twentieth century and during the subsequent Cold War years. 69 They also
include the rescue and evacuation operations in Southeast Asia during the Ford
Administration (which Fisher himself views as legitimate unilateral
actions) 170 and President Carter's attempt to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran.'
"None of the 200 incidents," contends Fisher, "comes close to justifying
military actions of the magnitude and risk of Korea in 1950, Panama in 1989,
Iraq in 1990, or Bosnia and Haiti in 1994." '' 72 This is certainly true for Korea
and Iraq, which involved combat on a major scale, but the story is, at the very
least, more complex regarding Bosnia and Haiti. In short, Fisher himself
overlooks distinctions among too many unlike cases and offers little discussion
of whether practice, at least with regard to the diverse array of small-scale
military actions, might be relevant in interpreting the Constitution's war
powers provisions.
173
2. Evaluating History: Between Judgment and Validation
Although historical practice is not self-validating, 174  it is still of
considerable importance in interpreting the Constitution and understanding the
President's war powers today.'75 The Supreme Court has not addressed this
issue in a war powers case, but it has provided general guidance on the use of
historical practice in constitutional interpretation in separation of powers cases.
In its most recent major case touching on this question, Dames & Moore v.
Regan,176 the Court relied heavily on the longstanding executive practice of
169. See, e.g., 1989 CRS REPORT, supra note 164, at 16-19; 1993 CRS REPORT, supra note 164, at
17, 19, 21.
170. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 186.
171. See 1989 CRS REPORT, supra note 164, at 17; 1993 CRS REPORT, supra note 164, at 18.
172. FISHER, supra note 4, at 188.
173. Nevertheless, Fisher's own methodical survey of historical practice (which includes many of the
cases on the often invoked list of over two hundred presidential actions) is a useful tool for demonstrating
that the patterns of history are more subtle than his cursory dismissal of those cases suggests, and that the
various uses of force can be categorized at least to some degree. At the broadest level, Congress authorized
or declared major wars (except for Korea), but not most lesser wars. I examine the question of "little" wars
below. See infra text accompanying notes 202-08. For a thoughtful discussion of these conflicts, see Jules
Lobel, "Little Wars" and the Constitution, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 61 (1995).
174. As the Supreme Court recognized in Dames & Moore v. Regan, "(plast practice does not, by
itself, create power." 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981). See also United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,
473-74 (1915) (arguing that decisions upholding executive action based on historical practice do not "mean
that the Executive can by his course of action create a power").
175. A number of scholars have addressed the question of the significance of historical practice with
regard to both separation of powers and war powers, although they differ significantly in their approaches
and conclusions. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 40, at 55-69, 78-80 (finding concepts drawn from
customary international law useful in identifying "constitutional custom"); HAROLD HONOJU KOtI, Tf1-
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 70-71 (1990) (discussing "quasi-constitutional custom" and its role
in national security affairs); Raven-Hansen, supra note 56, at 31-32 (relying on Supreme Court decisions,
particularly Dames & Moore, to identify "customary law"); Reisman, supra note 144, at 782-84
(identifying "operational code" reflected in war powers practice of Congress and President); Spiro, supra
note 144, at 1355-57 (drawing on customary international law concepts, but concluding that single
"incident" can create custom).
176. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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settling claims with foreign nations by executive agreement-a practice that
Congress had acquiesced in and never resisted-in holding that the President
possessed the authority to suspend claims pending against Iran in U.S. courts
as part of the agreement settling the hostage crisis.' 77 In so doing, the
Supreme Court embraced Justice Frankfurter's approach in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer,7 1 which sets a high standard for viewing past
practice as authority in constitutional interpretation.'
79
Frankfurter's Youngstown approach seems to me a promising one if
applied thoughtfully to the war powers context."s It has several components.
First, practice cannot "supplant" a clear constitutional requirement.'' As
Frankfurter wrote in another case, "[i]llegality cannot attain legitimacy through
practice."'112 The President thus cannot by practice appropriate Congress's
power to declare or commence war. Practice is relevant, however, to those
aspects of the division of war powers, such as the power of the President as
177. See id. at 686-88. While Congress had not directly authorized the suspension of claims by statute.
the Court emphasized that Congress could not be expected to "anticipate and legislate with regard to every
possible action the President may find it necessary to take" in foreign affairs. Id. at 678 The lack of
statutory authority, the Court reasoned, should not be taken to imply legislat.e disapproval, particularly
when "there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President.-
Id at 678-79. The Court then examined that history, which included eighty executive agreements to settle
claims between 1817-1917, and at least 10 since 1952. See id. at 679 & n.8. 680 & n 9 In concluding that
Congress had "implicitly approved" of that practice, the Court pointed to Congress's enactment of
legislation establishing procedures for distributing funds from claims settlements, which Congress had
regularly amended in light of new developments, thereby indicating its "continuing acceptance of the
President's claim settlement authority." Id. at 680-81. The Court also emphasized that Congress had never
objected to or questioned the President's authority to enter into claims settlements in general. see itd. at 681.
682 n.10, nor had it expressed disapproval of the specific agreement with Iran. see id. at 687-88 As the
Court wrote: "We are thus clearly not confronted with a situation in which Congress has in some way
resisted the exercise of Presidential authority." Id. at 688.
178. See id. at 686 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S 579. 610-11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
179. Justice Frankfurter joined Justice Black's majority opinion in Youngstown. %%hich saw no need
to examine historical practice because it viewed President Truman's seizure of steel mills as contrary to
the clear language of the Constitution, which vested in Congress, not the President. the po%%er to make law
As Justice Black wrote:
It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority have taken possession of pnvate
business enterprises in order to settle labor disputes. But even if this be true. Congress has not
thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry
out the powers vested by the Constitution "in the Government of the United States, or any
Department or Officer thereof."
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588-89 (Frankfurter J.. concumng). Frankfurter wrote separately. hoy ever. to
explain why "the considerations relevant to the legal enforcement of the pnnctple of separation of powers
seem[ed] ... more complicated and flexible" to him. Id. at 589. Frankfurter stressed the importance of
historical practice in giving meaning to the Constitution: The practical operation of goermcnt in our
system of separated but overlapping powers would, he wrote. "give[) essential content to undefined
provisions in the frame of our government." Id. at 610. Even regarding more open-ended constitutional
provisions such as the Executive Power Clause, however. Frankfurter set a high standard for giving practice
authoritative weight in constitutional interpretation. As he wrote. "'a systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned ... may be treated
as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President by § I of An. II." Id. at 610-I1
180. His approach, which I hope to apply more fully to war powers in future writing, is sketched only
briefly here. For a helpful analysis along the same lines, see Raven-Hansen. supra note 56. at 31-32.
181. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concumng).
182. Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517. 524 (1940).
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Commander in Chief over peacetime troop deployments, which are not
explicitly addressed in the constitutional text or Founding debates.
Second, the practice must be "systematic," "unbroken," and "long
pursued."'' 8 3 In the war powers context, the requirement of a "systematic"
practice means that one must differentiate between types of actions. Cases in
which the President has used limited force to rescue or protect American
citizens, for instance, cannot be used to claim executive authority to commit
American forces unilaterally to major hostilities. The further requirement that
an executive practice be "long pursued" and "unbroken" provides at least some
assurance, to use James Madison's words, that it does not represent simply
"constructions adapted on the spur of occasions, and subject to the vicissitudes
of party or personal ascendencies."'
Third, the executive practice must be "long pursued to the knowledge of
the Congress and never before questioned."'85 Congress, in other words,
must not only be on notice of an executive practice and accompanying claim
of authority to act; it also must accept or acquiesce in that practice and claim
of authority.8 6 Assessing whether Congress can fairly be said to have done
183. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Frankfurter found no such practice in
the Youngstown case. He differentiated some past cases, finding them not comparable to Truman's seizure
of the steel mills. For instance, he viewed as distinct Lincoln's seizure of railroads during the Civil War,
which occurred in territory where armed hostilities were underway and which subsequently was ratified by
Congress. See id. at 611 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He also distinguished President Wilson's eleven
seizures of industrial facilities during World War I because Wilson "acted, or at least purported to act,
under authority granted by Congress" and his seizures thus could not "be adduced as interpretations by a
President of his own powers in the absence of statute." Id. at 612 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Moreover,
"[olf twelve seizures by President Roosevelt prior to the enactment of the War Labor Disputes Act in June,
1943, three were sanctioned by existing law, and six others were effected after Congress, on December 8,
1941, had declared the existence of a state of war." Id. at 612-13 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Frankfurter
found only three "executive assertions of the power of seizure in circumstances comparable" to Truman's,
each of which took place "in the six-month period from June to December of 1941." Id. at 613
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). As Frankfurter concluded:
We need not split hairs in comparing those actions to the one before us, though much might be
said by way of differentiation. Without passing on their validity, as we are not called upon to
do, it suffices to say that these three isolated instances do not add up, either in number, scope,
duration or contemporaneous legal justification, to the kind of executive construction of the
Constitution revealed in the Midwest Oil case.
Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915), the Court upheld
the President's authority to withdraw public lands from private acquisition based on a longstanding
executive practice involving more than 252 actions over a period of 80 years. See 236 U.S. at 469-70.
184. Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert, supra note 103, at 370, 372. In Dames & Moore,
for example, the Court referred to over 90 executive claims settlement agreements during a period of over
180 years. See 453 U.S. at 679-80, 684. In Midwest Oil, the Court cited an executive practice spanning
80 years and involving 252 instances of executive action. See 236 U.S. at 469-70. Michael Glennon argues
that six factors are relevant in determining whether a custom exists--consistency, numerosity, duration,
density, regularity, and normalcy, with consistency being the one absolute requirement. See GLENNON,
supra note 40, at 55-59.
185. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
186. This requirement of congressional acquiescence in an executive action and accompanying claim
of authority bears some resemblance to the notion of "opinio juris" in customary international law. Only
those practices followed by states out of a sense of legal obligation, and not simply habit, are deemed to
be customary "law." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § I cmt. c (1965); ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
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so raises many complex and difficult issues of interpreting legislative intent,
particularly in the war powers context. For one thing, inferring congressional
acceptance of an executive practice and claim of power can be highly
speculative in cases where Congress as a body has not directly spoken.'S 7 In
addition, the provisions of the War Powers Resolution must be factored into
any plausible account of congressional acquiescence in recent executive
military action. Among other things, the Resolution makes clear that a statute,
including an appropriations act, should not be construed to authorize
introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities unless it expressly states such an
intent.188 In Dames & Moore, the Court relied both on collateral legislation
74-87 (1971). Applying the concept of "opinio juris" to the separation of powers context. Michael Glennon
argues that "a custom possessed of opinio juris must have been intended by both political branches to
represent a juridical norm." GLENNON, supra note 40, at 59. "It is thus mistaken." he points out. "merely
to string out bare references to historical incidents with no indication of the posture of the other branch."
Id.
187. Inferring any sort of collective intent on the basis of inaction is problematic when we arc dealing
with a large and complex institution like the Congress. made up of two houses and many dicrsc
individuals. For a perceptive discussion of this issue in the statutory context. see William N Eskndge, Jr.
Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 95-98 (1988). In the war powers context, there are
additional reasons to be particularly cautious about interpreting congressional silence or failure to protest
a particular action after the fact as acceptance of a President's authority to act. First, the basic structural
tendencies toward inaction are heightened when a President presents Congress with a militaryfait accompli.
especially if the deployment is politically popular. Exactly what Congress should be understood as
acquiescing to may not always be clear. Moreover, congressional acquiescence may be tied to very specific
and unique circumstances, as in the case of Grenada. for instance. Both houses of Congress passed
resolutions designed to start the War Powers Resolution's 60-day time clock following President Reagan's
commitment of U.S. forces to Grenada. See H.R.J. Res. 402. 98th Cong. (1983); Senate Amendment 2462
to H.R.J. Res. 308, 98th Cong. (1983), 129 CONG. REC. 529.829 (daily ed. Oct. 28. 1983). see also 129
CONG. REC. 529,838 (passage of Senate amendment). (The Senate defeated the amended bill subsequently,
however, and another version of the bill later passed without the Grenada Resolution See Joint Resolution
of Nov. 21, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-161,97 Stat. 1012.) Congress also sent a fact-finding mission to Grenada.
When that mission ultimately concluded that the risk to American citizens on the island had been a real
one, Congress took no further action. See Hedrick Smith, O'Neill Now Calls Grenada In% asaon "Jstified'
Action, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1983, at AI ("Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr.. who cnticized President Reagan
for 'gunboat diplomacy' in the invasion of Grenada, said today that a House fact-finding mission had
convinced him the action was 'justified' to rescue endangered Americans."). Congressional acquiescence.
in short, seemed to depend directly on the perception of an imminent threat to American hes In citing
Grenada as a "precedent" in support of his authority to send U.S. forces to Haiti without congressional
authorization, President Clinton did not acknowledge a qualification such as this. however.
188. See 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (1994); see also id. § 1547(a)(2) (providing that authonzation cannot
be inferred from treaty in absence of implementing legislation expressly stating that it constitutes specific
authorization under War Powers Resolution). In addition, section 2(c) of the Resolution can be read as
expressing Congress's judgment that the President's authority to commit U.S. forces into hostilities (or
imminent hostilities) is limited to situations where Congress has provided authorization. or where "a
national emergency [is] created by attack upon the United States, its teirtones or possessions, or its armed
forces." Id. § 1541(c). However, most members of Congress today would probably view 2(c) as incomplete
by virtue of its failure to include the President's authority to rescue U.S. citizens abroad w hose lives are
in imminent danger. See Thomas M. Franck, Rethinking War Powers: By Law or bs "Thaumaturgic
Invocation"?, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 766. 772 (1989). Legislation to expand the categones of 2(c) along these
lines has been introduced. See, e.g., S. 564, 104th Cong. (1995). Senator Biden's bill to reform the \Var
Powers Resolution recognizes the President's authority "to exticate citizens and nationals of the United
States located abroad from situations involving a direct and imminent threat to their lives " Id. § 101(a)(3)
Section 8(d)(l) of the War Powers Resolution, moreover, provides that nothing in the Resolution "is
intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President . 50 U.SC. §
1547(d)(1).
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that indicated legislative acceptance of a longstanding executive practice"'
and on the fact that successive congresses "consistently failed to object...
even when [they] had an opportunity to do so."' 90
3. Examples of Historical Validation
With respect to war powers, only two categories of historical practice seem
to me clearly to meet the Frankfurter standard embraced in Dames & Moore.
The first is the longstanding presidential practice of peacetime troop
deployments abroad-deployments in support of U.S. foreign policy that do
not involve commencing hostilities. A recent example is President Bush's
decision to send substantial American combat forces to Saudi Arabia following
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to deter further Iraqi aggression. The Constitution
does not clearly allocate this power, and successive congresses generally have
accepted or acquiesced in this executive practice. By accepting broad
presidential latitude in making peacetime troop deployments, congresses over
the years have recognized the value of presidential discretion and flexibility in
the fluid and often dangerous realm of foreign affairs. Yet Congress has not
thereby given up its own authority over such troop deployments. Instead, as
Louis Henkin argues, paraphrasing Justice Jackson's opinion in Youngstown,
"what history seems to have given the President is concurrent authority in a
twilight zone in which the President can act when Congress is silent."''
The second category of historical practice that meets the Frankfurter
standard, in my judgment, is the longstanding presidential practice of using
limited force to rescue American citizens abroad whose lives are in imminent
danger.192 Neither the constitutional text nor the original debates clearly
address executive authority in this context. The practice is well established
historically, although presidential claims of authority have changed somewhat
over time. 93 Congress, moreover, generally has accepted or acquiesced in
such protective actions involving "low risk of sustained hostilities or
On balance, the War Powers Resolution rejects an expansive view of the President's authority to
commit U.S. forces to hostilities unilaterally, although Congress's actions under that statute (particularly
its reluctance, in a wide variety of cases, actually to start the 60-day time clock) admittedly have been far
more ambiguous. See infra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Department's argument
regarding 60-day clock).
189. See 453 U.S. at 680-81.
190. Id. at 682 n.10.
191. HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 40, at 29; see
also SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 309 (discussing Jackson's "zone of twilight"). Under the War Powers
Resolution, the President must report to Congress within 48 hours when U.S. forces are introduced abroad
"while equipped for combat." 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (a)(2). These deployments do not, however, trigger the 60-
day time clock, although the subsequent onset of hostilities could do so.
192. For a thoughtful discussion of this practice, see Raven-Hansen, supra note 56, at 37-40.
193. Early presidents were more likely to invoke statutory or international law authority to justify their
actions, see id. at 38, while recent presidents have made broader claims about their inherent powers as
Commander in Chief. Protection of American "property," moreover, is no longer invoked by presidents (or
likely to be accepted by Congress) as a basis for defensive military action.
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escalation,"' 94 and has, in the "Hostage Act" of 1868,'93 provided statutory
authorization for certain actions that do not amount to acts of war.'9 So long
as military actions do not go beyond limited defensive measures designed to
evacuate or otherwise secure the safety of citizens in imminent danger, and so
long as they are unlikely to escalate or lead to sustained hostilities, they should
not encroach on Congress's war powers. Of course, this does not mean that the
President can rely upon threats to American citizens as a pretext for
unilaterally commencing hostilities against another state.
97
Historical practice has not given the President the legal authority to
commence war against another country, however, whether the war be large or
small. Both Fisher and I agree that the Constitution gives this power
unambiguously to Congress. Furthermore, of the dozen major wars in
American history, five were formally declared by Congress and six were
authorized by other legislative measures. 198 Although some presidents took
steps that made American involvement in war likely (for example, Polk before
the war with Mexico, Wilson before World War I, and Roosevelt before World
War II), they did not claim authority to take the country into war without
congressional authorization. Of the three wars since World War II, both the
Vietnam War (with the exception of Nixon's "secret war" in Cambodia) and
the Persian Gulf War were legislatively authorized.'" Only in Korea did the
President send American forces to war without seeking Congress's
approval. 200 In short, there is no longstanding practice of presidents




195. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1994).
196. See id.; see also Raven-Hansen, supra note 56. at 39 (discussing dctails of congressional
acquiescence in this practice, including statutory enactments such as "Hostage Act")
197. Professor Raven-Hansen put it well:
The rescue/protection authority ... [is] confined to cases of actual or reasonably imminent risk
to Americans. In addition, its logical limit is its immediate object: rescue and protctuon Once
American nationals are evacuated out of harm's way or otherwise secured, the authority is
exhausted. Neither customary law, as demarcated by the practice that Congress understood and
acquiesced to, nor international law as incorporated into the Hostage Act. permits the President
to order reprisals on his own initiative.
Raven-Hansen, supra note 56, at 39-40.
198. The five declared wars are the War of 1812. the Mexican-American W\ar of 1848. the Spanish-
American War of 1898, World War I, and World War 11. The wars authorized by other legislative measures
include the Naval War with France (1798-1800). the First Barbary War (1801-1805). the Second Barbary
War (1815), the Civil War, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War. The Korean War stands alone as
the only major war not expressly authorized by Congress. See generalh" JAMES GRAFI'ON ROGERS,. WORLD
POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION 45-55 (1945) (discussing various wars); WOR."LnI & FiRiAGE. supra
note 4, at 55-70 (same).
199. On the war in Indochina, see ELY. supra note 6. at 15-17. 68-97. On the Persian Gulf" War. Se
Stromseth, supra note 7, at 649 & n.293.
200. See Stromseth, supra note 7. at 621-35. Congress did. however. enact legislation to provide funds
for Korea and to extend the draft. See id. at 626. 630.
201. Spiro, supra note 144, at 1348; see also ELY. supra note 6. at 10; WOLMtr & FIRMAGE. supra
note 4, at 151.
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Historical practice with respect to "little wars" is a different story,
however. As Fisher's book shows, beginning in the early twentieth century,
presidents invaded and occupied a number of countries in the Caribbean and
Latin America without authorization from Congress. These particular
interventions, some of which involved prolonged occupation by U.S. forces,
went beyond any immediate need to protect the lives of American citizens;
presidents launched them primarily to secure American foreign policy goals,
especially order in the southern hemisphere on U.S. terms. Some presidents at
the time even called these interventions police actions to maintain law and
order, rather than wars.202 Admittedly, these military actions involved limited
risk of escalation or sustained hostilities due to the power disparity between
the United States and the invaded country. They are still best viewed as "little
wars," however. Occupying sovereign states and toppling or imposing
governments are acts of war under international law even if combat is limited,
and such actions are best understood as war for constitutional purposes as
well.203 During the Cold War years, presidents again deployed American
combat forces against sovereign states in our hemisphere without advance
congressional authorization, including in the Dominican Republic in 1965,
Grenada in 1983, and Panama in 1990.21
202. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 52-54. President Taft seemed to recognize later the difficulties with
this approach, however, when he suggested that different rules of international law applied to the
interventions in our hemisphere. See WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS
95 (1925).
203. John Bassett Moore expressed it well when he wrote:
There can hardly be room for doubt that the framers of the constitution, when they vested in
Congress the power to declare war, never imagined that they were leaving it to the executive
to use the military and naval forces of the United States all over the world for the purpose of
actually coercing other nations, occupying their territory, and killing their soldiers and citizens,
all according to his own notions of the fitness of things, so long as he refrained from calling
his action war or persisted in calling it peace.
5 JOHN BASSET MOORE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN BASSETT MOORE 196 (1944). The
constitutionally relevant factors, in other words, include not only the combat risks and escalatory potential
of a military action, but its purposes as well. Even if an adversary is weak, an intervention for the purpose
of deposing a government in power and occupying territory has the character of war, whereas a limited
rescue mission to free American hostages does not, even if the number of casualties would be roughly the
same in each case. As Professor Henkin has argued:
President Carter's attempt to rescue hostages held in Iran ... was not designed to fight a war
and was not likely to engage Iranian forces or threaten the independence or territorial integrity
of Iran-the relevant test under international law. The invasion of Grenada, by contrast,
whatever motivated it, sought to topple a government and occupy a territory. It was widely seen
as an act of war for international purposes, and it would seem to have had the character of war
for constitutional purposes. Good fortune kept deaths few on both sides, and as a result the
action won popular acclaim. But would the people have supported it had it proved costly? It is
not, I think, the kind of action the Constitution and our dual democracy intend to be undertaken
by the President on his own authority.
HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 40, at 40 n.*.
204. One scholar has argued recently that military actions such as the U.S. interventions in Grenada
and Panama form part of a pattern of small-scale "strike operations" that do not "qualify as 'war' in either
the common or the constitutional sense" because they "do not involve sustained sacrifice on the home front
or significant infliction of casualties on other peoples." Spiro, supra note 144, at 1353. Other scholars view
these actions as part of a broader pattern of presidential "war-making": "To dismiss American interventions
in Latin America as 'minor,"' argues Henry Monaghan, "amounts to recognition of presidential power to
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Even if this pattern of unilateral executive action in "little wars" can be
characterized as a "systematic" and "longstanding" practice (which is at least
open to question given the different circumstances of the various
interventions), it is in tension with the Constitution's clear language and intent,
vesting the power to commence even limited or "imperfect" wars in Congress
alone. Nor can congressional acquiescence in a presidential "little war" power
be confidently claimed on the historical record.05 What has developed, as
Jules Lobel cogently argues, is a practical tension between the de jure
standards of the Constitution and the de facto "'operational code"' represented
by recent practice.206 The War Powers Resolution in practice has tended to
reinforce a de facto "short war" power in the President, even though its
language clearly does not authorize it.2°7 In other words, "the President
wage war against weak opponents for limited purposes." Monaghan. supra note 143, at 27. Yet Monaghan
ultimately argues that the President has acquired just such power through practice. See d. at 31. Spiro. in
my view, includes in his "strike operation" category actions that should be differentiated into separate
categories, namely, actions against "insubstantial foes" such as in Panama and Grenada, on the one hand.
and rescue operations characterized by "discrete, self-limiting objectives" such as the Iran Hostage rescue
operation. See Spiro, supra note 144, at 1353.
205. The cases during the Cold War era, for instance, do not support a conclusion that Congress
acquiesced in a presidential claim of authority to commence war against "insubstantial foes." Instead. in
each case, the President essentially confronted the Congress with afat accomph and argued that emergency
military action was needed to protect American lives at risk. Even if the President clearly had broader
objectives in mind as well, Congress was understandably cautious about second-guessing a President who
claimed to be protecting endangered U.S. citizens. See. e.g.. J. WILUIAM FULBRIGHT. TE ARROGANCE OF
POWER 49 (1966) (discussing U.S. intervention in Dominican Republic). Nevertheless. many members of
Congress criticized President Reagan for failing to consult with Congress before invading Grenada, and
both Houses of Congress passed separate resolutions to trigger the 60-day war powers clock. The record
of Congress's response in that case suggests that Congress at most acquiesced in President Reagan's claim
that American citizens were at risk and required immediate rescue. See supra note 187
206. See Lobel, supra note 173. at 71-72 (quoting W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E_ BAKER.
REGULATING CovERT ACTION 24 (1992)).
207. The War Powers Resolution cannot be read as authorizing short wars because the Resolution
makes clear that none of its provisions "shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with
respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities" which he or she would not
otherwise have in the Resolution's absence. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d) (1994) (emphasis added). Moreover.
section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution, while preambular and legally unenforceable, expresses
Congress's view that the President's power unilaterally to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities is limited
to certain emergency situations. See id. § 1541(c); Lobel, supra note 173, at 71. The Justice Department
recently has argued, however, that the "structure" of the Resolution (particularly its 60-day time clock
provision) presupposes presidential authority to deploy U.S. forces into hostilities in situations beyond those
declared in section 2(c). See OLC Haiti Opinion, supra note 142. at 123-25. For a thoughtful critique of
this argument, see Lori Fisler Damrosch. The Constiunonal ResponsibilatY of Congress for Mfltarv
Engagements, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 58, 63-67 (1995).
Other plausible interpretations of the "structure" of the Resolution are also possible. howe',er. which
reconcile section 2(c) and the 60-day provision. For one, the 60-day clock applies not only when U S
forces are introduced into hostilities, but also when they are introduced into situations involving an
imminent likelihood of hostilities. See 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a). This provision thus could be viewed not as
presupposing presidential authority to introduce U.S. troops into hostilities but as mapping "the twilight
zone" in a broader array of cases. The 60-day clock could also be viewed as providing a procedural
framework for limiting the sustained deployment of U.S. forces overseas "'where hostilities have erupted .
because another party has attacked U.S. troops deployed ... in a noncombatant or defensive posture."
Damrosch, supra, at 64. Even if the Justice Department's interpretation is adopted as the most plausible,
however, the Resolution should not be understood as "presupposing" presidential authority that is clearly
inconsistent with the Constitution. To give an example, the War Powers Resolution should not be read to
"presuppose" that President Bush had constitutional authority to commence the Persian Gulf War without
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seems to be conceded the power ... to start short wars," although this "is not
what the drafters of the Constitution had in mind.208 The existence of this
tension requires a direct response to the question of the obsolescence of
original intent: Do the purposes and values that led the Founders to give
Congress the power to commence war, including limited wars and armed
reprisals, still apply with the same force in our world?
Ell. CONSTITUTIONAL WAR POWERS TODAY
A. Original Purposes in the Modem World
Advocates of expanded presidential war powers often invoke America's
role as a global superpower and changes in weapons technology since 1789 as
justifications for their position. "The best that can be argued in support of
presidential war power after World War II," writes Fisher, "is that the
language of the Constitution, the intent of the framers, and the republican
values operating at that time are no longer relevant, having been superseded
by twentieth-century conditions and pressures. 20 9 Fisher clearly and
emphatically rejects such claims. Neither the dangers of the post-World War
II period, nor changes in the role of the United States, nor treaty commitments,
nor the existence of nuclear weapons, he contends, have altered how we should
understand the Constitution's basic allocation of war powers.21° The
Founders understood the need for prompt defensive action in emergency
situations, he emphasizes, and they responded appropriately by agreeing that
the President could "repel sudden attacks" against the United States.2"
Fisher is right to focus on the basic purposes underlying the Founders'
allocation of war powers and to remind us that they, like us, lived in
dangerous times. They understood the need for an energetic executive who
could protect "the community against foreign attacks"2 2 and guard against
"the ambition or enmity of other nations" in an uncertain world. At the
same time, they also understood the dangers of concentrating too much power
in one person's hands, particularly power to initiate war against another nation,
with all the risks and sacrifices that would entail.214 As Madison explained,
the authorization of Congress, even though that conflict was completed well within 60 days. Compliance
with the procedural requirements of the War Powers Resolution, in short, does not by itself assure
compliance with the Constitution.
208. Franck, supra note 89, at 626-27.
209. FISHER, supra note 4, at xii-xiii.
210. See id. at 185-88.
211. See id. at 185.
212. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter cd., 1961).
213. THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 208 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing
powers of national government).
214. See HAMILTON & MADISON, supra note 1, at 89-90 (James Madison).
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"the trust and the temptation would be too great for any one man."
2 5
Instead, the legislature-the branch most directly representative of the
American people-was given the power to commence war.
Like Fisher, I find the republican values that led the Founders to place the
crucial decision to go to war in Congress's hands to be equally compelling
today, especially with regard to the initiation of large-scale hostilities?.2
6
Then as now, decisions of such grave significance should be made not by the
President alone but by the collective deliberation of the people's elected
representatives in Congress. If anything, twentieth-century developments-such
as the existence of a powerful standing army at the President's disposal and
the greater destructiveness of modem day warfare-reinforce the arguments
against vesting the power to initiate war in a single set of hands. Congressional
authorization of war as an expression of the people's support remains vitally
important today, moreover, for a number of reasons: to ensure American
combat forces that the country is behind them; to convey American resolve to
adversaries as well as allies; and to reduce the chances that Congress will
precipitously undercut a deployment in the face of adversity because the
country was unprepared for the risks ahead.
Yet the world has changed markedly since 1789, and the United States
now plays a global role larger than anything the Founders could have foreseen.
For one thing, the United States is the most powerful member of the United
Nations, an organization empowered to respond collectively, with force if
necessary, to threats to international peace and security. Translating the
Founders' fundamental purposes regarding war powers into a time when
American forces participate in UN "peace enforcement" and "peacekeeping"
operations217 -as in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia-is more complex than
Fisher's book acknowledges. Whether recent presidential commitments of force
in cases such as these are akin to commencing "war" or "reprisals" and thus
require prior congressional approval is not so clear.2'8 Moreover, whether the
President's defensive power to "repel sudden attacks" applies only in cases of
215. Id. at 89.
216. The case has been made compellingly by John Ely. who rejects claims that the original
understanding of the Constitution's war powers provisions is obsolete See ELY. supra note 6. at 5-9 For
a similar argument with respect to "little wars." see Lobel. supra note 173. at 72-75 With respect to
certain UN-authorized military actions, see Stromseth, supra note 139. at 156-60
217. "Peacekeeping" operations are undertaken with the consent of the parties to a conflict and
generally only involve the use of force in self-defense. "Peace enforcement" operations, in contrast. may
be undertaken without the consent of the parties and may involve the use of force under Chapter Vii of
the United Nations Charter to achieve a range of objectives. While they go beyond traditional peacekeeping.
such operations still generally stop short of major combat action. See PAMiELA L REED ET AL. HANDBOOK
ON UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 2, 4-5 (1995).
218. Cf. FISHER, supra note 4, at 160 (claiming that NATO air strikes in Bosnia involved "tak(ingl
the nation to war" and that Clinton Administration's peacekeeping policy would diminish, or extinguish,
"the constitutional role of Congress in matters of going to war"). In a more recent article. Fisher suggests
that the President needed congressional approval to send U.S. forces to Bosnia to implement the Dayton
Peace Agreement. See Louis Fisher, What Power to Send Troops?. N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 2. 1995. at 21
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actual attack against U.S. territory or forces, as Fisher seems to suggest,"'
or should be understood more broadly today warrants fuller analysis.
Particularly in light of the practical tension that has developed between the
strict classical view Fisher defends and much post-World War II practice, he
needs to say more in order to persuade (or even fully engage) those on the
other side.
In this Part, I will explore some of the challenges involved in translating
the Founders' concerns into contemporary circumstances, first by addressing
the President's authority as Commander in Chief to "repel sudden attacks," and
then by examining how Congress's power to declare war and authorize
reprisals should apply to the commitment of U.S. military forces to UN-
authorized military operations along a spectrum from the Persian Gulf War, to
Haiti, to Bosnia. In developing a refined classicist position, my goal is to
engage those who take opposing views more seriously than does Fisher in
order to stimulate a richer dialogue about how to understand the Founders'
animating purposes in our world.
B. The President's Defensive War Powers
Contemporary war powers scholars differ sharply over how broadly to
interpret the President's defensive war powers. Everyone agrees, citing James
Madison's notes of the Constitutional Convention, that the President has "the
power to repel sudden attacks. 220 While nonclassicists view this phrase as
merely illustrative of broader power,22' scholars in the classicist school tend
to regard it as a crystallization of the basic understanding of the Founders.222
Even fellow classicists disagree, however, over how to understand the
President's power today in light of modem technology and America's more
significant global role. John Ely, for example, argues that actions not
amounting to actual attacks on American territory may threaten the security of
the United States today more obviously than in the Founders' day.223 Thus
he interprets the President's authority to repel sudden attacks as applying not
only to attacks on U.S. territory but also to extend "functionally" to "other
situations where a clear danger to our national security has developed so
219. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 7, 185-88.
220. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 27, at 318-19.
221. See, e.g., Rostow, supra note 63, at 22-23.
222. The phrase in Madison's notes does, in fact, accord with other sources from the Constitution's
ratification, as I argued in Part I. Still, one must be cautious about placing too much reliance on Madison's
notes alone without further confirmation from other sources. As Leonard Ratner writes, Madison's
"explanatory clause was not included.in the constitutional text nor given the scrutiny of proposed inclusion.
That clause thus recognized, but did not authoritatively delineate, the warmaking authority of the President,
implied by his role as executive and commander-in-chief .... Leonard Ratner, The Coordinated
Warmaking Power-Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Roles, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 466-67 (1971).
223. See ELY, supra note 6, at 6-7. Examples cited by Ely include imminent attacks on the United
States, or a Soviet invasion of Canada or Mexico.
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unexpectedly, and immediate military response is so imperative, that advance
congressional authorization to respond militarily simply cannot be
awaited.''" 24 In such cases, though, Ely argues that the President must request
congressional authorization "at the latest, simultaneously with the issuance of
the order dispatching the troops."2''
Most other classicists view the President's authority more narrowly. Many
contend that the President can only commit U.S. forces to combat unilaterally
to repel actual attacks against the United States or its armed forces. "' This
seems to be Fisher's view as well.2 7 As explained previously, however, I am
not convinced that even the Founders understood the President's authority so
narrowly.?28 At the very least, they likely viewed the Chief Executive and
Commander in Chief as having power, comparable to that of the states, to take
military action without prior authorization from Congress if the country was
"actually invaded" or "in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay. '229 Thus the President possesses the power not only to "repel" attacks
but also to forestall imminent attacks against the United States and its armed
forces.230 In addition, as practice has confirmed, the President has the
authority to take limited military action to rescue American citizens in
imminent danger abroad.23' While the Founders gave no clear indication of
this power, "underlying the Constitutional language and [Madison's]
explanatory clause is a long-range purpose that authorizes the President to
protect Americans from external force in an emergency."' 2
Beyond this point, Ely is right to argue that the President possesses
constitutional authority to respond unilaterally with force in cases where a
genuine and serious threat to the security of the United States "has developed
so unexpectedly, and immediate military response is so imperative, that
advance congressional authorization to respond militarily simply cannot be
awaited,'233 with the clear understanding that he or she present the matter to
Congress as soon as possible. The Founders understood how dangerous and
224. Id. at 6.
225. Id. Ely argues further that the U.S. military response must be "disconunucd if such authonzaton
is not promptly forthcoming." I
226. See, e.g., WORMUTH & FIRAGE, supra note 4, at 299; Brger, supra note 147. at 43-45. Lobel
includes sudden attacks against American citizens as well. See Lobel. supra note 173. at 77 & n.62.
227. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 7. 185-88.
228. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see Bestor, supra note 40. at 611-12; Franck. supra note 89. at
608. The most prominent "imminent" dangers of their day included threatened attacks on U.S. terrtory by
Indian tribes, various European powers, or pirates, as well as possible internal rebellions.
230. This is essentially the position taken in the original Senate version of the War Powers Resolution.
See S. REP. No. 93-220, at 22 (1973). The Senate bill also recognized the President's power to "rescue
United States citizens and nationals abroad and on the high seas" in certain circumstances. Id. at 23. For
a discussion of the negotiations between the House and Senate that led to the War Powers Resolution
ultimately adopted, see Franck, supra note 89, at 611-14.
231. See supra notes 90, 192-97 and accompanying text.
232. Ratner, supra note 222, at 467.
233. ELY, supra note 6, at 6.
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unpredictable the world was even in 1789, and it is hard to imagine that they
would not have expected the President as Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive to protect the country from serious external threats in emergency
situations, with force if necessary, so long as he or she sought guidance from
Congress at the earliest opportunity.2  The nature of modem military
technology, which confronts us with threats incomparable in their speed and
potential destructive power to those faced in 1789, only reinforces such an
understanding.
Does this view of the President's defensive war powers open the
floodgates and potentially allow the President to commit the country to war
whenever he or she thinks that "national security interests" so dictate? Not if
the qualifications the Founders envisioned are taken seriously today-namely,
that the President should come to Congress as soon as possible in cases that
go beyond repelling force with force and should avoid changing the state of
things, or moving the country into war, unless war is thrust upon the nation by
an attacker. While the President ultimately has
the power to judge in the first instance whether a given event
constitutes an imminent threat to our survival and demands a response
which leaves no time to seek Congress' acquiescence in that
judgment, such limited discretion falls far short of authorizing
assumption of his defensive war-making powers whenever the interest
jeopardized is labeled a "vital security interest.
' 235
In the end, what fundamentally divides classicists is not whether, in an
emergency, the President should be able to send U.S. forces into hostilities in
response to a sudden and urgent threat to the country's security short of a
direct attack; rather it is whether that power should be understood as within,
or as outside, the law.236 Invoking a theory of "executive prerogative"
accepted by some of the Founders, Fisher contends:
234. See Ratner, supra note 222, at 488 ("An accommodation of presidential and congressional
warmaking power accords the President authority to defend the national security, provided he requests
congressional authorization as soon as possible-before combat, if time is available, otherwise promptly
thereafter.").
235. Note, supra note 60, at 1784.
236. Jules Lobel argues, for example, "Today, as in 1787, the reality is that American national security
can be adequately served if the President's power to use American forces in combat unilaterally is reserved
to repelling sudden attacks on American troops, territory, and citizens." Lobel, supra note 173, at 77. Lobel
acknowledges, however, that some other contingencies might still exist in which we would want the
President to be able to act unilaterally-for example, to destroy preemptively a chemical weapon after
receiving compelling evidence that a terrorist nation had imminent plans to detonate it over New York City.
Such instances, he argues, are best handled as emergencies outside the law-an approach taken by many
of the Founders who "believed that the problems associated with creating a constitutional basis for the
exercise of emergency power outweighed the dangers of allowing the President to act extra-constitutionally
and unlawfully in extreme crisis situations." Id. at 78; see also Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the
Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1392-97 (1989) (discussing liberal paradigm of emergency
power based on doctrine of prerogative). The President, in short, should take the necessary action, even
though it is not lawful; he or she should later seek post hoc ratification from Congress.
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In a genuine emergency, a President may act without congressional
authority (and without express legal or constitutional authority),
trusting that the circumstances are so urgent and compelling that
Congress will endorse his actions and confer a legitimacy that only
Congress, as the people's representatives, can provide.
This is what Lincoln did at the beginning of the Civil War in imposing a naval
blockade against the seceding southern states.Y28 When Congress returned,
Lincoln sought its authorization, explaining that the actions he had taken,
"'whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be
a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress
would readily ratify them.' 239  Fisher views Lincoln's invocation of
"prerogative" followed by congressional ratification as "the model for all
Presidents." 2' ° Such an approach, he argues, is less likely to lead to
unrestrained executive action than modern expansive conceptions of defensive
presidential war power.24'
My own view differs from Fisher's more in metaphysics than in spirit. On
the one hand, I view the President's core defensive power to "'repel sudden
attacks" more broadly than he does.242 On the other hand, in cases beyond
repelling or forestalling attacks against the United States, its forces, and
citizens, I share his view that the President should come to Congress at the
earliest opportunity if he or she concludes that American forces must be sent
into combat in response to a sudden and urgent threat to the country's security.
Yet unlike Fisher, I think the President's ability to respond with force in such
emergency situations should be understood as within, not outside, the law.
Indeed, as I read Madison and Hamilton, it is hard for me to conceptualize
such power as "outside" the law. 243 Moreover, today, even more than at the
237. FISHER, supra note 4, at 87.
238. See id. at 187.
239. Id. at 38 (quoting 7 A COMPILATION OF THIE MESSAGES AND PAPERS o- THE PRESIDINIS.
1789-1987, supra note 115, at 3225).
240. FISHER, supra note 4, at 187. Fisher also commends Jefferson. %ho hikeisc endorsed this
approach. See id. at 27.
241. The "prerogative" approach, Fisher argues, would result in ratification by Congrm retrospccti'cly
in individual cases, rather than in precedent-setting claims of emergency power See FISHER. supra note
4, at 187; see also NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 9. at 32: Lobel. supra note 173. at 78-79
(noting cogency of Justice Jackson's concern that "emergency powers ... tend to ktndlc emergenctes"
(quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579. 650 (1952) (Jackson. J. concurrng))
242. See supra text accompanying notes 85-93.
243. Madison in the Pacificus/Helvidius debate was critical of Locke's discussion of "prerogatve"
See HAMILTON & MADISON, supra note I, at 56 n.* (James Madison) ("The chapter on prerogalise shows.
how much the reason of the philosopher was clouded by the royalism of the Englishman.") There arc risks.
moreover, in conceptualizing the President's power to "repel sudden attacks" too narroA ly and thus creating
a need to act outside the law too often. As Madison argued in another context: "It is in vain to opposc
constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vam: because it plants in the
Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and
multiplied repetitions." THE FEDERAUST No. 41, at 257 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961)
Hamilton likewise argued:
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Founding, the Lockean "prerogative" argument-namely, "I acted outside or
beyond or even against the law, but necessity required it"-is hard even to
articulate comfortably within our modem constitutional discourse. Still, the
various classicist approaches agree on the presumption that the President, in
cases beyond repelling sudden or imminent attacks against the United States
or its citizens, should come to Congress as soon as possible to seek its
authorization if American forces are sent into combat against another state. It
is this presumption, recognized by our earliest presidents, that is too often
forgotten by presidents today who claim inherent authority to send American
troops into combat in a broad array of situations beyond repelling or
forestalling attacks against the United States or its citizens, even when time
and circumstances clearly would allow for authorization by Congress. What
has changed most since 1789 is not the wisdom of the Founders' basic
approach-which recognized presidential authority to act in an emergency in
response to external force but not to initiate war-but the willingness of
presidents to acknowledge the qualifications they intended.
Nonclassicists, of course, view the President's defensive war powers more
broadly. Some contend that the President can make war short of formally
declaring it, subject only to Congress's power of the purse.244 Others argue
that the President can forcibly exercise U.S. rights under international law
short of placing the country in a legal "state of war., 245 Still others contend
that the President can commit U.S. forces to a "defensive war," even if the
United States or its forces have not been attacked and even if time permits
congressional approval.246 I explained in Part I why these are less persuasive
accounts of the original understanding of war powers than the refined classical
view.
247
At the same time, these accounts do raise several issues that merit greater
attention by scholars of the classicist school. First, they correctly stress the
diversity and range of military actions, from peaceful troop deployments to
limited uses of force of various kinds, that are a vital and integral part of
foreign policy; and they properly emphasize that not all of these are
tantamount to commencing "war" for constitutional purposes. Strict classicists
too often equate almost any use of force abroad with "war" without explaining
why that should be So.248 Second, the nonclassicists look to the law of
Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot
be observed, because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by
necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers
towards the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same
plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 167 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
244. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 63, at 174, 241, 266-67, 295-96.
245. See, e.g., Rostow, supra note 63, at 6, 10, 16-17.
246. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 41, at 914-15.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 45-62, 75-100.
248. Fisher shares this tendency. See supra note 218.
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nations at the time of the Founding (and subsequently) as an important source
of insight on the allocation of war powers.249 Professor Abraham Sofaer,
whom I regard as within the classicist school broadly defined, likewise has
suggested ways in which the law of nations, together with patterns of historical
practice, can help illuminate the scope of the President's war powers.2 The
question of what is "war" for constitutional purposes, and the significance of
international law in addressing that issue, deserves more attention from
scholars today. It has taken on new urgency in the post-Cold War era as the
United States participates in a wide range of military operations authorized by
the UN Security Council to protect international peace and security.
C. "War" and Multilateral Military Action: Three Case Studies
How then should we understand Congress's power to "declare War and
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal" today? Translating the Founders'
purposes for giving Congress the power to commence war into a very different
world in which the United States plays the most powerful military role in the
United Nations system is a challenging endeavor, particularly when the
military actions at issue involve relatively limited uses of force in pursuit of
collectively authorized objectives. For one thing, the Founders did not
contemplate a collective security arrangement like the United Nations when
they allocated war powers between Congress and the President. 5 ' They also
thought in very different terms: "War" and "Reprisals," rather than collective
"enforcement actions" or "peacekeeping" operations, were on their minds.
Moreover, the changes in international law since the Founding have been
profound. Initiating "offensive war" is no longer a right of sovereign states.
The UN Charter speaks not of "war" but of the "use of force," and it provides
that forcible action is legal under international law if authorized by the
Security Council 2 2 or if undertaken in self-defense.-
3
Fisher reasonably rejects the claim that Security Council authorization by
itself, pursuant to the UN Charter, gives the President the power under the
249. A few classicist scholars have also examined the law of nations to help shed light on the
Founders' understanding of war powers. Charles Lofgren. for example, examines international law treatises
known to the Founders in his piece on the original understanding. See Lofgren. supra note 35. at 689-97.
Jules Lobel thoughtfully explores the issue of imperfect war and letters of marque and reprisal. See Lobel,
supra note 47.
250. See Sofaer, supra note 69, at 37, 42, 50-51.
251. Traditional balance-of-power alliances were the predominant security arrangement of the time.
See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law. 42 VAND. L REv. 819, 839.
845 (1989).
252. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41-42.
253. See id. art. 51. For helpful discussions of the law of the UN Charter. see A.%ThO.Y CLARK
AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (1993). and Louis Henkin. Use
of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT v. MIGHT. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37 (2d
ed. 1991).
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Constitution to commit U.S. troops to hostilities.254 But that is only the
beginning of the analysis. Hard questions of how to understand the Founders'
purposes in the UN context remain, even under the classical view. Operations
ranging in nature and scope from major combat in Korea and the Persian Gulf,
to "peace enforcement" in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia, to "peacekeeping" in
Macedonia, clearly are not all constitutionally equivalent.255 Instead, as I
have argued elsewhere, 6 the President's authority to commit American
forces to multilateral operations without advance congressional approval varies
depending on the nature and circumstances of each operation. The moderate
classical view that I defend is more nuanced than Fisher's view. It also comes
to very different conclusions than either the "offensive/defensive war" or the
"formal war/shared power" views on how to understand the respective war
powers of Congress and the President today. These differences are highlighted
most clearly in the case of the Persian Gulf War, but they can be seen in the
cases of Haiti and Bosnia as well.
1. The Persian Gulf War: Liberating Kuwait After the Iraqi Invasion
The American-led combat operation to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait in
early 1991 was the most substantial military action authorized by the UN
Security Council since the Korean War.257 This collective military action was
in direct response to Iraq's unlawful invasion of Kuwait and its subsequent
refusal to withdraw, despite months of diplomacy and economic sanctions.
President George Bush, commendably, obtained authorization from Congress
before sending American forces into battle against Iraq.258 Before and after
the War, however, he contended that he did not need Congress's authorization
under the Constitution to "kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait" once the
Security Council had approved the action.259 The Bush Administration
invoked historical practice as support for this claim.26° A majority of
Congress disagreed, however. The House of Representatives adopted a
resolution affirming that any offensive military action against Iraq required
254. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 70. I examine this issue in Stromseth, supra note 139, at 160-66.
255. Fisher's book, however, seems to treat many of them as such in several places. See FISHER, supra
note 4, at xii, 160-61.
256. See Stromseth, supra note 139, at 160-66.
257. See Stromseth, supra note 7, at 598-99, 640, 644.
258. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-I, 105 Stat.
3, 4 (1991), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note at 175-76 (1994).
259. President George Bush, Remarks at the Texas State Republican Convention in Dallas, Texas,
1992 PuB. PAPERS 993, 995 (June 20, 1992).
260. See, e.g., Persian Gulf Hearings, supra note 142, at 590 (statement of Richard Cheney, Secretary
of Defense) (invoking Korea as precedent for presidential authority to send U.S. forces into combat against
Iraq without congressional approval). Cheney neglected to observe any distinction between Truman's
emergency deployment of American forces to stop the immediate onslaught of North Korean troops and
the situation in the Persian Gulf, where allied forces had been amassing for several months before
ultimately taking military action to liberate Kuwait.
[Vol. 106: 845
War Powers
prior and explicit congressional approval.' Senator after senator likewise
argued that the commitment of over 400,000 Americans to combat against Iraq
"would plainly be war" and that the Constitution thus required Congress's
approval."s2
Was congressional authorization required under the Constitution before the
President sent American forces into battle to expel Iraq from Kuwait? Under
the classical view, the answer is clearly yes. While President Bush undoubtedly
had the authority to deploy American forces to Saudi Arabia to deter and
protect against further Iraqi aggression, as he promptly did in August 1990
following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the decision to initiate
combat against Iraq to reclaim Kuwait is a different question. It was effectively
a decision to commence war for constitutional purposes because of the nature
and circumstances of the military operation and the magnitude of the risks
involved. American forces were sent into sustained combat to defeat a
powerful adversary. While the casualties were thankfully fewer than
expected, 63 the risks were enormous. The commitment of American forces
to military action on this scale involved hazards and sacrifices of the sort that
led the Founders to give Congress the power to declare war. Moreover, the
long diplomatic prelude to military action against Iraq provided ample time for
a judgment by Congress whether the interests at stake were worth going to
war.
26 4
Nonclassicists reach a different conclusion on the Gulf War and view it as
an easy case for presidential war power. Some argue that the President can
make war with the military forces available to him, subject only to Congress's
exercise of its power of the purse.-2 65 Under this view, President Bush would
have acted well within the Constitution had he attacked Iraq without
congressional authorization. 2 66 This view, however, does not accord with the
261. See H.R. Con. Res. 32, 102d Cong. (1991). The vote was 302 to 131. See 137 CONG. REC H405
(daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991).
262. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. SI01 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1991) (statement of Sen. Mitchell); see also
Stromseth, supra note 7, at 650-53 (discussing congressional views during Persian Gulf War debates).
263. According to Pentagon reports, 148 Americans were killed and 467 were wounded in action
during the Persian Gulf War. See Pentagon Increases Figure on Casualties from American Fire. N.Y
TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at A8.
264. Of course, the President must be able to defend the nation when %-ar tis thrust upon it. and to
repel sudden attacks against the United States, its forces, and citizens. The President also has 'hell-
established authority to order peacetime troop deployments in support of U.S. foreign policy and to protect
U.S. security interests, as President Bush did in sending American forces to Saudi Arabia to thwan further
aggression by Saddam Hussein. Under the classical view, the President also can respond with force in other
emergencies where a sudden and serious threat to the country's security requires urgent military response
and time does not permit advance authorization from Congress. This was not the situation in the Persian
Gulf, however. War was not thrust upon the United States by an adversary, leaving no time for legislative
deliberation.
265. See, e.g., Constitutional War Powers Hearings. supra note 63. at 481 (statement of Gary Bom);
Yoo, supra note 63, at 174, 241, 268, 295.
266. Professor Rostow's view is more nuanced: The President can exercise U.S. rights under
international law, including rights of self-help and self-defense, short of placing the nation in a formal
"state of war," as that term is understood in international law. See Rostow. supra note 63. at 6. 10. 16-17,
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fundamental republican principle reflected in the Constitution that the decision
to expose the country to the hazards of war, if war had not already been thrust
upon us by an adversary, should not be made by the President alone; rather,
the decision should reflect the deliberation and judgment of the legislature-the
branch most directly representative of the American people, whose lives and
resources will be placed on the line.267
In the case of the Gulf War, Professor Rostow argued that the President
did not need congressional authorization to send American forces into battle
against Iraq because he was not placing the United States in a "state of war"
but rather was taking care that U.S. treaty law, namely the UN Charter, was
faithfully executed.268 The treaty execution argument advanced by Rostow
warrants fuller examination than space permits here. It is doubtful, however,
that the war powers vested in Congress as a whole by the Constitution can be
superseded by a treaty approved by the Senate alone, as I have argued more
fully elsewhere.269 Nor did the UN Charter attempt to preempt Congress's
war powers. Although states are legally obligated to carry out the "decisions"
of the Security Council,270 Chapter VII of the Charter (in particular Article
43) reflects an understanding that the Security Council cannot order or require
a state to commit its forces to military action in the absence of an Article 43
agreement ratified according to that state's "constitutional processes. '27' In
practice, moreover, the Security Council has never required states to use force;
it has simply authorized or recommended that they do so. Thus the President
has never been legally obligated to "execute" the Charter by committing U.S.
forces to combat in a specific case.272 In sum, the treaty execution argument
does not prevail in the case of the Gulf War.
Of course, as Rostow properly emphasizes, the UN-authorized combat
operation against Iraq was fully consistent with international law and the right
of collective self-defense recognized in the UN Charter.273 Consistency with
international law, however, is not dispositive under the classical view in
determining whether congressional authorization is required under the
Constitution. After all, at the Founding, "declaring War" and issuing "Letters
267. See text accompanying notes 25-26, 29-34, 91-96.
268. See Constitutional War Powers Hearings, supra note 63, at 229-33 (statement of Prof. Eugene
Rostow).
269. See Stromseth, supra note 139, at 153-56.
270. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48.
271. Id. art. 43, para. 3; see also Stromseth, supra note 139, at 155. The Senate approved the UN
Charter with this understanding as well. See Stromseth, supra note 7, at 604-05. No Article 43 agreement
has been concluded by the United States. See id. at 620.
272. Under the War Powers Resolution, moreover, authority to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities
"shall not be inferred ... from any treaty" unless the treaty is implemented by legislation that specifically
authorizes introducing U.S. forces into hostilities. See 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(2) (1994).




of Marque and Reprisal" were sovereign rights under the law of nations, 74
but the domestic constitutional authority was given to Congress.
The constitutional purposes to be served by legislative deliberation remain
relevant, moreover, even when the Security Council has authorized military
action.275 The Security Council, for example, does not provide the kind of
check on unilateral presidential action that the Founders sought from Congress.
While a variety of viewpoints generally are represented on the Council, U.S.
presidents have been able to exert considerable influence and obtain
authorizing resolutions when they wanted to take military action, as they did
in Korea, the Persian Gulf, and Haiti. Furthermore, the democratic concerns
that led the Founders to give the power to declare war to Congress are not
satisfied by the vote of a body that neither represents the American people as
a whole nor is politically accountable to them. Security Council
authorization-which would not be possible if the United States exercised its
veto-provides a reason to consider seriously committing American forces to
collective military action. However, it is not a compelling reason to short-
circuit congressional deliberation over whether U.S. forces should be sent into
combat.
Proponents of the "offensive/defensive war" view argue that the President
did not need authorization from Congress to send U.S. forces into battle
against Iraq because it was a "defensive war.' 276 Robert Turner, the leading
exponent of this view, acknowledges that translating the Founders' purposes
into current circumstances involves some uncertainty. 7  Yet he ultimately
views Congress's power to declare war very narrowly and the President's
powers broadly. Whether Congress's power to declare war is implicated today
in a given case depends, for Turner, on whether "offensive war" of the sort
that would have required a prior declaration of war at the Founding is
involved.27 ' By this he means a war of aggression of the kind that is now
prohibited under international law. 279 Under this view, so long as the
President is responding to a war initiated by someone else, he or she can send
American forces to battle unilaterally, even if time permits congressional
approval and even if the United States or its forces have not been attacked. In
the case of the Persian Gulf, Turner contended:
274. See, e.g., VATrEL, supra note 49, at 285 ("It belongs ... to sovereigns alone to make and order
reprisals .... ); id. at 292 ("[T]he sovereign power alone is possessed of authonty to make war -).
275. For a contrary view, see Thomas M. Fmnck & Faiza Paid, UN Police Action in Lieu of War
"The Old Order Changeth", 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 74 (1991).
276. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 43, at 30 n.51.
277. See Constitutional War Powers Hearings. supra note 63. at 424 (statement of Robert F Turner.
Professor, University of Virginia School of Law).
278. See Tumer, supra note 41, at 914. 917.
279. See id. at 915-16; see also Emerson. supra note 43. at 30 (arguing that defensive actions do not
require congressional approval).
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When the President decides to risk the use of armed force in
cooperation with the United Nations or other treaty partners in an
effort to restore peace and end armed aggression, he is not "initiating"
a "war" but defending the rule of law. No "declaration of war" is
necessary or appropriate in such circumstances."'
Although congressional authorization would be prudent and desirable, it is not,
for Turner, constitutionally required.
There are several problems with this view. First, the evidence from the
Founding calls into question such a narrow reading of Congress's war powers
and such an expansive conception of presidential war powers.2"' In modern
circumstances, moreover, to view Congress as merely possessing a "veto" over
a war of "aggression" initiated by the President means that Congress's
constitutional war power has little current significance.282 Yet the very
purposes that Turner admits were behind this congressional "veto" over
aggressive war-such as "prevent[ing] the Commander in Chief from
endangering the lives of America's youth and the solvency of the national
treasury by launching painful and costly wars over political, diplomatic, or
economic grievances"283 -are still relevant in cases where war has not been
thrust upon the United States by an enemy. If the United States or its forces
are not under attack, and if time for legislative deliberation exists, why should
the President alone decide whether the United States should enter war at the
behest of another state? In the case of the Gulf War, the fact that combat to
expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait was a "defensive" response to Iraq's prior
aggression does not automatically vitiate the constitutional purposes to be
served by legislative deliberation, particularly when months for deliberation
existed. This was not a situation, like that facing the NATO alliance during the
Cold War years, where a sudden attack against West Germany by the Soviet
Union would also literally have been an attack against the forces of the United
States stationed there.2 4 Turner, in the end, does not explain why we should
understand Congress's power as narrowly and the President's power as broadly
today as he suggests.
280. Constitutional War Powers Hearings, supra note 63, at 426 (statement of Robert F. Turner,
Professor, University of Virginia School of Law).
281. See supra text accompanying notes 45-62.
282. Turner acknowledges this. See Turner, supra note 41, at 919-20.
283. Id. at 914.
284. The real key to making the U.S. commitment to NATO credible, as the Europeans long
understood, was not a treaty provision declaring that an attack on one was an attack on all, but rather
American willingness to place American soldiers on the front line in Western Europe to demonstrate that
any Soviet attack against Western Europe was also an attack against the United States. In authorizing the
stationing of substantial American forces in Europe for over 40 years, moreover, Congress understood that
deterrence depended on a credible threat that the President would "repel sudden attacks" against them. For
a more complete discussion, see JANE E. STROMSETH, THE ORIGINS OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: NATO's
DEBATE OVER STRATEGY IN THE 1960s (1988).
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Nor does historical practice support such an open-ended view of
presidential war power. Of the cases in which presidents have committed U.S.
forces to combat on a major scale--cases that are widely viewed as
"wars"-only Korea was not expressly authorized by Congress.2 Presidents,
as noted above, have taken other defensive actions in support of allies in crisis
situations, but none involved committing U.S. forces to hostilities on the scale
of the Gulf War.2"' In sum, given the nature and risks of the action against
Iraq, the time available to secure congressional authorization, and the lack of
long-standing historical practice to the contrary, prior approval from Congress
was required under the Constitution.
2. Haiti: Deploying Forces to Restore Democracy
Haiti presents a more complex case, raising war powers issues that warrant
a more subtle analysis than Fisher's book provides.8 7 President Clinton
dispatched U.S. troops to Haiti in September 1994, with Security Council
authorization,88 to remove the military regime of General Raoul Cedras and
restore President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power. By the time U.S. forces
actually landed in Haiti, an American negotiating team had achieved a last-
minute diplomatic breakthrough with General Cedras, who agreed to relinquish
power voluntarily. American forces thus landed with the consent not only of
President Aristide, Haiti's lawfully elected leader, but also of the de facto
Haitian government in circumstances (and with a peacekeeping mission) hardly
tantamount to commencing war. The more difficult constitutional question,
however, is whether the President's initial decision to send U.S. combat forces
to Haiti to remove the Cedras regime by force and return President Aristide to
power required prior approval from Congress.
The President had ample time to seek congressional authorization before
ordering U.S. forces to Haiti; the deployment was not an emergency action to
repel a sudden attack. President Clinton, however, did not seek authorization
from Congress and contended that he was not constitutionally required to do
so. Instead, executive branch lawyers argued that the "nature, scope and
duration" of the deployment, including the limited risk of hostilities, meant that
it was not "war" in the constitutional sense. 29
285. See supra note 198.
286. See Raven-Hansen, supra note 56, at 42-43.
287. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 154-57.
288. See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR. 49th Sess.. U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994)
289. See OLC Haiti Opinion, supra note 142, at 122. 125. This was one of three factors which. in
"combination ... provided legal justification for the planned deployment." Id. at 122. The OLC Opinion
also argued that the deployment "accorded with the sense of Congress" expressed in section 8147 of the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994. id. at 122-23, and that the War Powers Resolution
"recognize[d] and presuppose[dl" unilateral presidential authonty. id. at 123. to commit U S. forces in cases
such as Haiti "where the risk of sustained military conflict was negligible." id. at 125. For thoughtful
critiques of these arguments, see Damrosch, supra note 207. at 61-63. Michael J Glennon. Too Far Apart:
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Did the deployment of American combat forces to Haiti amount to
commencing "war" under the Constitution, such that the authorization of
Congress was required? If we examine the nature and objectives of the
operation, and the purposes underlying the constitutional allocation of war
powers, the better argument is that the deployment as originally planned would
have constituted a commencement of "war" or an armed "reprisal" against the
Cedras government for constitutional purposes, notwithstanding the
authorization of the United Nations and the consent of President Aristide. Even
if the hostilities and risks were expected to be far smaller in Haiti than in a
major combat operation such as the Gulf War, the objective of the action was
a far-reaching one: to remove an existing government by force. Moreover,
while the purposes behind legislative deliberation are most compelling in cases
involving major and sustained combat, they still are relevant in cases of lesser
hostilities as well. That the Founders wanted the commencement of even
limited hostilities or "imperfect war" to be authorized by Congress is
reinforced by the Marque and Reprisal Clause, which gave Congress control
over the limited uses of force, such as reprisals, common in that day.29° The
Founders understood that initiating reprisals against another state could easily
escalate and lead to war, and they vested this power in Congress because of
the potentially serious consequences of committing the country to such
action. 29t
The risks of escalation were admittedly low in the case of Haiti, given the
disparity of power between the countries involved. At the same time, however,
the United States was not facing a "sudden attack" or some other urgent threat
to its security that required immediate presidential action. Instead, ample time
and opportunity for legislative deliberation existed before the President decided
to commit American combat forces to Haiti to remove the Cedras regime. In
these circumstances, the question whether U.S. interests were worth the risks
involved in commencing hostilities is, for a classicist, best understood as a
judgment for the legislature to make.
Even some nonclassicists find Haiti to be a close case. Robert Turner
acknowledges, for instance, that whether the contemplated U.S. intervention
in Haiti could be viewed as "defensive" action is by no means certain under
Repeal the War Powers Resolution, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 17, 22-27 (1995), and Letter from Professors
Bruce Ackerman et al. to Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (Oct. 14,
1994), in 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1995) [hereinafter Letter from Professors to Dellinger]. For a rejoinder,
see Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War: Presidential Power and the Use of Military Force, 50 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 107 (1995).
290. As Abraham Sofaer persuasively argues, "[t]he Constitution says Congress shall 'declare' war,
and it seems unreasonable to contend that the President was given the power to 'make' undeclared war,
especially since the Constitution gives Congress control of those types of military actions short of formal
war commonly resorted to during that time." SOFAER, supra note 39, at 4; see also Lobel, supra note 47,
at 1040-47, 1059-61, 1089-94 (discussing significance of Marque and Reprisal Clause); Lobel, supra note
173, at 66-70 (same); Lofgren, supra note 35, at 695-97, 699-700 (same).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
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his analytic framework because "there was not even a suggestion that General
Cedras and his associates had planned, threatened, or engaged in the use of
armed force against another state." 292 In the end, however, he concludes that
"[t]he better view is probably that the existence of U.N. Security Council
authorization and the President's duty and power to see the laws faithfully
executed provide ample independent legal authority for the President to act
with whatever military resources the Congress has seen fit to place at his
disposal. 293 For those who adhere to the "formal war/shared power" view
of war powers, however, Haiti is not a hard case at all. The President and the
Congress should respond as they think the exigencies of the situation require,
short of the President unilaterally placing the United States in a formal state
of war, just as they have over the course of American history.
Presidents admittedly often have acted unilaterally in taking military action
of the scale contemplated in Haiti, in contrast to combat of the magnitude
involved in the Gulf War. Thus, not surprisingly, the Clinton Administration
appealed to past executive interventions in the southern hemisphere in
contending that the President did not require congressional authorization to
commit American combat forces to Haiti. President Clinton invoked Panama
and Grenada as precedents. 2'9 The Justice Department cited past cases of two
types to bolster its argument that the contemplated military action in Haiti did
not amount to "war" for constitutional purposes: those in which the
government of a state invited U.S. military action, and early twentieth-century
interventions by the United States in the Caribbean to promote "order.""'" As
in these cases, the Justice Department argued, there was only a "limited
antecedent risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed
resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties" in Haiti.6
Assessing arguments from history in a case such as this is less
straightforward than in the case of major wars. Yet each of the strands of
"precedent" invoked by the executive branch is problematic, in varying
degrees, as support for unilateral action in Haiti. Unlike the interventions in
Grenada and Panama, 29 no imminent threat to the lives of American citizens
292. Turner, supra note 41, at 916 n.58. Instead, "It]he apparent reason for U.N. intervention was the
promotion of democracy." Id.
293. Id. at 920 n.76.
294. See Haiti News Conference. supra note 142. at 1576 ("[A]II my predecessors in both panes have
clearly maintained that they ... did not have to have congressional approval for every kind of ulitary
action.... There was not congressional approval in advance of the actions in Panama and Grenada.-).
295. See OLC Haiti Opinion, supra note 142, at 125 & 126 n.6.
296. Id. at 126.
297. Congress's reaction to the Grenada intervention suggests that concern for the safety of Amencans
on the island largely explains congressional acquiescence after an initial protest of the deployment. See
supra note 187. Unlike Grenada, Panama was invaded while Congress was in recess. Although the
President's claim that Americans were in imminent danger was far weaker in Panama and the broader
objectives of deposing and arresting General Manuel Noriega were clear, the operation was virtually
complete when Congress resumed and few members were interested at that point in challenging a politically
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was even arguable in Haiti. The cases of military action by invitation cited by
the Justice Department all involved action at the behest of the government
actually in power, in contrast to Haiti, where the intervention was designed to
depose the de facto regime. While the consent of President Aristide
strengthened the international legitimacy of the planned intervention, forcibly
removing a sitting government is a quite different situation than coming to the
aid of one actually in power. Even the Justice Department acknowledged,
moreover, that deploying forces at the invitation of a country's legitimate
government might require congressional authorization in some cases,
depending on the circumstances. 298 In the "little war" cases of the early
twentieth century, presidents argued that they were not going to war but rather
were promoting "order"-in the nature of "police action." Yet those
interventions, which in some cases involved toppling governments, did
constitute acts of war under international law, even if the magnitude of the
hostilities was limited by the disparity of power between the countries
involved; they are best understood as constituting "war" for constitutional
purposes as well.299 In the end, no unproblematic, longstanding, and
systematic practice clearly analogous to the Haiti situation can be confidently
invoked.3 °
3. Bosnia: Implementing and Enforcing a Peace Agreement
A final case I would like to examine is the commitment of American
forces to Bosnia to help implement the Dayton Peace Agreement, concluded
popular fait accompli. Even before the intervention, moreover, a number of members of Congress had
expressed support for military action to remove Noriega from power. See Sofaer, supra note 69, at 54,
298. See OLC Haiti Opinion, supra note 142, at 126 ("We are not suggesting, however, that the United
States cannot be said to engage in 'war' whenever it deploys troops into a country at the invitation of that
country's legitimate government."); see also Letter from Professors to Dellinger, supra note 289, at 129-30
("Presumably, at the outset of World War II, General deGaulle could not have nullified the Constitution's
requirement of congressional approval by 'inviting' the United States to invade occupied France.").
299. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
300. Nor do I ultimately find persuasive the Justice Department's claim that the President's decision
to deploy U.S. forces to Haiti to depose the Cedras regime accorded with the "sense of Congress"
expressed in section 8147 of the 1994 Department of Defense Appropriations Act. See OLC Haiti Opinion,
supra note 142, at 122-23. Certainly, under the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, that "sense of
Congress" resolution did not authorize the subsequent deployment. Moreover, the legislation invoked by
the Justice Department was adopted by Congress almost a year before the actual intervention, at a time
when the only military action authorized by the United Nations was a limited peacekeeping operation. See
Stromseth, supra note 139, at 173. Congress, especially the Senate, admittedly did send some mixed signals
in the months and weeks leading up to the U.S. intervention, see id. at 173-76, but Congress's repeated
refusal to cut off funds prospectively for military action in Haiti said more about its sensible reluctance to
limit the President's ability to negotiate effectively with General Cedras and convince him to leave
voluntarily than it said about congressional approval of possible military action. The debates in Congress
and the various resolutions passed immediately before the President's deployment conveyed opposition
more than support for unilateral executive action. In fairness, however, Congress seemed to want it every
way: neither to authorize expressly, nor to prohibit, nor to speak unambiguously regarding a possible U.S.
military intervention in Haiti. Cf. ELY, supra note 6, at 47-48 (arguing same point about Vietnam War).
1996] War Powers
in November 1995.30 Approximately eighteen thousand American troops
were deployed in Bosnia by early 1996 as part of NATO's Implementation
Force (IFOR). They were deployed primarily for the purposes of monitoring
a ceasefire and separating the previously warring factions as part of a
negotiated peace settlement accepted by all the parties to the conflict.' The
Clinton Administration argued, persuasively in my view, that American
involvement was critical to the success of the peace plan, and that the Dayton
Agreement was Bosnia's best hope for the future after an especially bitter and
brutal war. Before deploying American forces, moreover, President Clinton
said he would "welcome a Congressional expression of support for U.S.
participation" in IFOR. s30 The President, however, neither sought nor
acknowledged the need for congressional authorization.
Congress, in the months leading up to the Dayton Agreement, passed a
number of resolutions on the question of sending American troops to
Bosnia. 30 In mid-December of 1995, after the President announced his
decision to commit U.S. forces to IFOR, opponents of the deployment in
Congress even sought to block the use of funds for this purpose. Both the
House and the Senate rejected these measures. 3"5 Instead, after heated debate,
301. Fisher's discussion of Bosnia in his book predates the Dayton PeaCe Agreement. However. his
discussion of American participation in UN peacekeeping operations suggests that he would view
congressional authorization as required for a troop deployment such as that in Bosna-a position that he
confirmed in a subsequent article. See supra note 218.
302. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Annexes I-11.
reprinted in 2 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 140-46, 155-67 (1995).
303. President's Letter to Senate Democratic Leader Thomas Daschle on Implementation of the Balkan
Peace Process, 31 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 2177. 2177 (Dec. II. 1995). The Administration had
indicated for over a year that President Clinton would not send U.S. forces to Bosnia to implement a peace
agreement without giving Congress an opportunity to speak to the issue. For example, on October 5. 1993,
Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Oxman said that the Clinton Administration would consult with
Congress and not commit American troops to a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia without congressional
support. See RICHARD F. GRIMMErr, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: TWENlY-TWo YEARS OF
EXPERIENCE 35-36 (Congressional Research Serv. No. 96476 F, May 24. 1996).
304. On September 29, 1995, the Senate passed an amendment to the State, Commerce. and Justice
Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1996, which expressed the sense of the Senate that funds provided by
the bill should not be used to deploy U.S. combat troops to Bosnia unless Congress first approved the
deployment in advance or to evacuate endangered UN peace keepers. See GRIMM[E1r'. rupra note 303. at
37. On October 30, the day before the Dayton peace talks began, the House passed a resolution objecting
to the presumption that U.S. troops would automatically be involved in implementing a peace accord in
Bosnia, and stating that "no United States Armed forces should be deployed on the ground in the temtory
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce a peace agreement until Congress has approved such
a deployment." H.R. Res. 247, 104th Cong. (1995). On November 17. the House passed another resolution.
probably in response to signs that a peace agreement at Dayton was about to be reached, to prohibit the
use of "funds appropriated or otherwise available" to the Department of Defense for the deployment of
grcund troops to Bosnia "as part of any peacekeeping operauon or as part of any implementation force."
unless such funds were specifically appropriated by Congress. See H.R. 2606. 104th Cong. § I (1995). In
fact, even as early as mid-1993, Congress had enacted legislation addressing the issue of funding for
Bosnia. Section 8146 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1994 stated the sense of
Congress that none of the funds appropriated by the Act should be used to deploy troops for a new
peacekeeping mission to Bosnia, unless previously authorized by Congress. See Pub. L No 103-139. §
8146, 107 Stat. 1418, 1474 (1993).
305. On December 13, both Houses considered and defeated legislation that would have blocked the
use of funds for the deployment of troops to Bosnia. This simultaneous legislative activity was probably
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the House adopted a resolution expressing "serious concerns and opposition to
the President's policy" of deploying American ground forces to Bosnia, while
declaring its "pride and admiration" for the Americans serving there.306 The
Senate was more affirmative: It expressed "unequivocal[] support[]" for the
U.S. armed forces in Bosnia, while noting "reservations" about the President's
decision to deploy them.3 7 Given that the President already had made a
commitment to send troops, the Senate "recogniz[ed] that ... preserving
United States credibility is a strategic interest" but indicated that U.S. forces
should stay only for "approximately one year." The Senate also called for
detailed reports, every sixty days, on the status of both the military and civilian
aspects of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. 308 The disparate
House and Senate resolutions were never reconciled, however. Later, in a deal
with the congressional leadership, the President obtained a tacit agreement that
funds from Department of Defense authorizations for fiscal year 1996 could
be used for Bosnia.3° In the end, Congress as a body opted neither to block
the deployment of American combat forces to Bosnia nor to authorize it.
Whether congressional authorization was required under the Constitution
is a complex question, but, in my view, the better answer is no. While a direct
vote in Congress to authorize American participation in IFOR would have been
preferable, as a matter of policy and accountability, to Congress's more
ambiguous stance, the commitment of American troops to help implement the
Dayton Peace Agreement did not entail commencing "war" or reprisals against
another state. Although the deployment, given the bitter history of the Bosnia
conflict, was and is hardly without risks, each of the parties to the conflict
agreed to abide by the terms of the peace accord. They also agreed to IFOR's
well-defined role in implementing it. American forces thus arrived not to
impose peace, but rather to monitor a negotiated settlement accepted by the
parties on the ground.
The Bosnia mission, admittedly, is not a traditional UN peacekeeping
operation, authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, in which force is
authorized only in self-defense and then only as a last resort. While Congress
induced by the fact that the President would attend the final signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in
Paris the next day and by a letter from the President to Congress asking for a vote of support. See
President's Letter to Senate Democratic Leader Thomas Daschle on Implementation of the Balkan Peace
Process, supra note 303. First, the Senate considered and overwhelmingly rejected H.R. 2606, 104th Cong.
(1995), a measure passed by the House several weeks earlier to prohibit Department of Defense funds from
being used to deploy troops to Bosnia. See 141 CONG. REc. S18,470 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (rejecting
H.R. 2606 by vote of 77 to 22). Likewise, the House defeated H.R. 2770, 104th Cong. (1995). a bill to
prohibit federal funds from being used for the deployment of troops to Bosnia "as part of any peacekeeping
operation, or as part of any implementation force." In contrast to the Senate, the House bill was defeated
by a narrow margin of 218 nays to 210 yeas. See 141 CONG. REc. H14,848 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1995).
306. See H.R. Res. 302, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
307. See SJ. Res. 44, 104th Cong. (1995).
308. See id.
309. See Donna Cassata, Clinton Accepts Defense Bill in Bid for Bosnia Funds, 53 CONO. Q. 3672,
3672 (1995); Louis Fisher, The Bosnia Commitment, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at 22, 23.
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can limit American participation in such peacekeeping operations, the troops
involved are unlikely, in most cases, to become embroiled in hostilities, and
the President thus would not require congressional authorization under the
Constitution or the War Powers Resolution.310 The role of IFOR in
implementing the Dayton Agreement goes beyond traditional peacekeeping,
however, and includes authority, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to use
force to compel compliance with the Agreement. But each of the parties to the
conflict has itself consented to giving IFOR this power, distinguishing this
operation from other recent nonconsensual "peace enforcement" operations
under Chapter VII, including those in Bosnia and Somalia.
31 1
Other factors, to be sure, argued in favor of congressional authorization.
These included the fragility of the peace agreement and the risk of relapse into
hostilities, and the substantial commitment of American combat-ready forces
for a lengthy period of time to an unsettled region. Prudentially, a vote of
authorization by Congress clearly would have been desirable as a statement of
American commitment and resolve, and as an indication to the U.S. forces in
Bosnia that the country supported their mission. Given the consensual nature
of the deployment and the limited objectives of IFOR's mission, however, it
did not involve commencing war or reprisals with all the risks and sacrifices
they entail, and Congress's authorization thus was not constitutionally required.
Instead, the commitment of American forces to Bosnia is best viewed as part
of the longstanding historical practice of peacetime troop deployments for
foreign policy purposes. Such deployments fall within the zone of concurrent
authority where the President can act in the absence of legislation to the
contrary.
3 12
How to understand the Constitution's allocation of war powers today-in
light of the challenges of translating original purposes into the UN context, and
in light of subsequent historical practice-is a difficult question over which
thoughtful scholars inevitably will continue to disagree. In evaluating the
respective war powers of Congress and the President in three recent cases-the
Persian Gulf, Haiti, and Bosnia-I have tried to grapple with the hard issues
raised. In so doing, I have sought to emphasize the value of a more candid,
nuanced conversation about the Founders' animating purposes and about their
applicability today. Fisher commendably begins this effort in his book, but his
failure fully to engage those on the other side or to probe the complexities of
recent small-scale deployments renders his effort incomplete.
310. See Stromseth, supra note 139, at 161-62.
311. See id at 146-47, 162-63. The Clinton Administration indicated, moreover. that wule force will
be used, if necessary, to compel rogue elements to comply with the agreement, the United States does not
intend to become embroiled in a war if the peace accord collapses and the parties resume their fighting.
See, e.g., The News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast. Dec. 4, 1995). available in LEXIS.
News Library, Macleh File (interview with William Perry, Secretary of Defense).
312. See supra text accompanying note 191.
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IV. WHAT ABOUT REFORM? RESTORING CHECKS AND BALANCES
Fisher's overriding goal in Presidential War Power is to reverse the
tension that has developed during this century between the Founders'
understanding of congressional responsibility for the commencement of war
and the practice of unilateral presidential action with only token consultation
with Congress. t3 Understanding the causes of this tension is essential to
evaluating Fisher's reform proposals.3 4 In this Part, I examine the major
factors he identifies as contributing to Congress's reduced war powers role in
recent years, as well as the reforms he advocates to rectify the situation. I then
explain why several additional, deep-seated factors must be taken into account
in assessing the prospects for reform. Next, I examine whether, and to what
extent, the international and domestic changes resulting from the Cold War's
demise are likely to lead to a more substantial war powers role for Congress
in the future.
Fisher identifies two main factors that have contributed to unilateral
presidential action and a diminished role for Congress in decisions to commit
U.S. forces into hostilities. First, the pressures and leadership responsibilities
accompanying America's growing world role during the twentieth century led
to expanded presidential claims of power, particularly in the years following
World War ]I.3t As the Cold War commenced and the United States signed
on to numerous collective security treaties, presidents claimed a corresponding
authority to commit American forces abroad in response to threats to U.S.
security interests around the world. The pressures and recurring crises
accompanying America's expanding global role, moreover, often led Congress
to acquiesce in, or at least fail to challenge, executive actions impinging on its
constitutional war powers, especially during the height of the Cold War.
3t6
The decline in Congress's war powers role was reinforced by the "real or
contrived urgency" accompanying "many of the great policy decisions of the
postwar era"; congressional belief in "the cult of executive expertise" in
matters of foreign policy; and a sense of "penance" for Congress's "prewar
isolationism. ''317 Some of these factors no longer apply to the same degree.
313. Of course, presidential conduct even in the post-World War II period is not completely uniform.
Some modem presidents, such as President Eisenhower, sought congressional authorization for military
deployments. In numerous other instances, however, presidents have notified and "consulted" Congress only
on the eve of military intervention.
314. Those who view original intent somewhat differently than Fisher does may dispute the nature and
magnitude of the tension, although they may in any event still lament the decline of congressional
responsibility. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 69, at 54 ("It would be preferable, legally and politically, for
Congress to participate more often in decisions concerning force.").
315. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 45, 185-88.
316. See id. at 121-22 (citing NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 9, at 8). As the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee wrote in 1969, the experience of "world involvement and recurrent crisis"
since 1940 was new to the United States and gave rise "to a tendency toward anxious expediency in our
response to it." NATIONAL CoMMrrMENTS REPORT, supra note 9, at 8.
317. NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 9, at 16.
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The Vietnam experience led Congress to reassert itself and to view executive
claims of expertise more skeptically, for instance, and the ongoing sense of
crisis and emergency that marked the Cold War years has dissipated."" Yet
the United States remains the only global superpower today, and pressures for
it to play a leading role across a spectrum of conflicts remain strong.
Second, Fisher highlights certain institutional factors that have contributed
to executive assertions of power at the expense of Congress. Among the most
important, he argues, is the growing role of short-term political appointees in
the executive branch who often "advocate heavy reliance on executive powers
and inherent authority, thus eliminating the need to build congressional
support" even though this often proves harmful to the political system as a
whole.19 In addition, "the disparate defense measures available to the
President and to Congress" contribute to the imbalance between them. '2
Congress is not as centralized or unified in defending its constitutional
prerogatives. On the contrary, congressional leaders "are often at cross-
purposes: partly inclined to protect their institution, but just as disposed to
defend the President's powers and interests," especially when the President is
of their own party.321 Institutionally, in short, the executive branch is more
likely to take the initiative and claim authority in military matters, whereas
Congress is more likely to be divided in response.
In light of the factors he identifies, Fisher offers proposals to help restore
checks and balances and assure greater legislative control over the commitment
of U.S. forces into hostilities. For one, Fisher urges the President and his
advisors to study and learn from history, which he believes shows that
unilateral presidential assertions of military power, without the support and
cooperation of Congress, generally have had unfortunate consequences for the
President and for the country over time.32 Presidential aides, he argues,
should reflect on the larger interests of the country and the enduring
importance of the system of checks and balances. There is real wisdom in
Fisher's emphasis on the importance of learning from history, and not simply
deploying it as precedent to validate unilateral executive uses of force. Yet
history's lessons are more complex. Among other things, the history of
American foreign relations surely also shows the critical importance of
presidential leadership in difficult times, as well as the value of executive-
legislative cooperation. In addition, it shows that Congress has, on occasion,
318. 1 will analyze the effects of the end of the Cold War more fully below. See infra text
accompanying notes 340-41.
319. FISHER, supra note 4, at 202; see id. at 203.
320. Id. at 204.
321. Id. The willingness of the Democratic Party leadership to delay a vote on Prsidcnt Clinton's
decision to send U.S. troops to Haiti is one recent example. See Stromscth, supra note 139. at 176. 178-79
322. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 203.
1996]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 845
been more bent on war than the President 32 3 and less subtle in its response
to complex crises; and that an isolationist and overreaching Congress can
create real risks both to American security and to effective U.S. engagement
in world affairs. Indeed, many members of the current Congress could benefit
from reading some history as well. Those periods in history in which both
Congress and the President worked together constructively (such as the early
years of the Republic and the Eisenhower years) would be particularly fruitful
to study.3 24 A significant feature of these periods was Congress's willingness
to provide the President with flexible authorizations to use force for particular
purposes. Although Fisher expresses some caution about this approach to war
powers, it nevertheless deserves further examination.
Fisher urges Congress to strengthen the War Powers Resolution in various
ways, 32 6 but unlike other scholars who have made similar proposals, 327 he
does not advocate a more active judicial role in enforcing it. This is surprising
in light of Fisher's belief in the clarity of the Constitution and his focus on the
prominent role of the courts in the early years of the Republic in cases bearing
upon war powers; but it does reflect a realism about the reluctance of courts
today to rule on the merits in war powers cases.328 "Instead of relying on
unpredictable court decisions," Fisher argues, "Congress must learn to invoke
the powerful weapons at its command," particularly its power of the purse, to
323. One example is the case of the Spanish-American War at the turn of the century. See FISHER,
supra note 4, at 41-43.
324. I share Peter Spiro's belief in the value of studying history, but not necessarily his view about
the periods most illuminating and relevant for today. See Peter J. Spiro, Old Wars/New Wars, 37 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 723,744-47 (1996) (reviewing FISHER, supra note 4; WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-
HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE (1994)) (arguing that periods of
congressional dominance in foreign affairs should be primary focus of study today for their sobering
lessons).
325. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 187-89. To be sure, if congressional authorizations are too broad
and are not supplemented with ongoing consultations, they run the risk of serving as a blunt "blank check"
that diminishes Congress's real participation in critical decisions, as Congress found after adopting the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution. That Resolution, like those adopted during the Eisenhower years, was broader than
it needed to be. In the early years of the Republic, Congress seemed to strike a better balance by giving
the President authorizations to use force for clearly specified purposes (e.g., to protect the frontiers, to
pursue pirates), see, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 69, at 41, 48-49, and the circumstances of the time imposed
additional practical restraints. For a discussion of the Eisenhower years, see FISHER, supra note 4, at
103-11, SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 159-63, and SUNDQUIST, supra note 132, at 113-16. Today, partly
in response to its own behavior in adopting the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Congress is properly reluctant to
provide open-ended authorizations in the face of complex and rapidly evolving conflicts. While that caution
is well founded, Congress and the President can craft authorizations that meet the concerns of both branches
if they are determined to do so, as they did prior to the Persian Gulf War and (after the fact) for the first
phase of the Somalia operation. (The second phase of that operation is a different story.) For an argument
in favor of Congress authorizing the President to use force, short of war, in a number of circumstances, see
Louis Henkin, War Powers "Short of War", 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 201, 206 (1995).
326. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 191-94. Among other things, Fisher recommends that the
Resolution's 60-day period be shortened or even eliminated, that funding restrictions be included, and that
the consultation requirements be strengthened.
327. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 6, at 63-67, 115-38 (advocating strengthened War Powers Resolution);
id. at 54-60 (arguing that judges should police "malfunctions in (the] process" by "remanding" cases to
Congress to fulfill its constitutionally mandated role),
328. For an argument against this reluctance, see id. at 54-60.
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"define and limit presidential power."329 Congress, in short, has ample tools
at its disposal to ensure a vigorous system of checks and balances. Yet given
the pattern of recent history that Fisher presents, particularly the trend towards
last-minute notice and consultation with Congress prior to presidential
commitments of force abroad, he fails to explain why we should have much
confidence that either Congress or the President is likely to change their recent
behavior or why his suggested amendments to the War Powers Resolution
have much chance of being enacted or followed.
What if the causes of the tension go even deeper? What if Congress's
reduced role in decisions to commit U.S. forces to hostilities today is rooted
in factors beyond those that Fisher describes? Three such factors come to
mind. First, and perhaps most fundamentally, is the recurrent reluctance of
Congress itself, as a political body very responsive to constituent moods, to
make a commitment and vote on whether U.S. forces should be sent into
hostilities (at least not in advance). Sometimes, to be sure, the President has
confronted Congress with what amounts to a military fait accompli because it
allows little or no practical opportunity for deliberation. However, members of
Congress have themselves often avoided tough decisions over whether to
commit U.S. forces abroad and have, in the words of one, "preferred the right
of retrospective criticism to the right of anticipatory, participatory
judgment."3 In short, as John Ely cogently argues, a "tacit deal" has existed
between the President and Congress for much of the Cold War era, under
which the President "take[s] the responsibility" for sending U.S. troops into
hostilities "as long as he can make the decisions, and Congress . . . live[s] with
a lack of power as long as its members don't have to be held
accountable. 33' Congress instead reserves the right to "scold" the President
after the fact if things go wrong.
332
A second factor that has existed since the beginning of the Republic is at
work as well. The President's preeminent role in diplomacy-and the practical
continuities between diplomacy, threats of force, and possible uses of force in
the conduct of foreign policy 333 -gives the President a substantial ability to
influence the prospects of war or peace by creating what Alexander Hamilton
called "an antecedent state of things." 33 Historian Arthur Schlesinger
explained it well: "If the President were to claim all the implications of his
control of diplomacy, he could, by creating 'an antecedent state of things,'
329. FISHER, supra note 4, at 199.
330. The War Power After 200 Years: Congress and the President at a Constitutional Impasse:
Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on War Powers of the Senate Comn on Foreign Relations. I00th
Cong. 366 (1988) (statement of Sen. Eagleton).
331. ELY, supra note 6, at 87-88.
332. See id. at 88.
333. See Don Wallace, Jr., The War-Making Powers: A Constitutional Flaw?. 57 CORNEI. L REV.
719, 723, 733-35 (1972).
334. HAMILTON & MADISON. supra note 1. at 13 (Alexander Hamilton).
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swallow up the congressional power to authorize hostilities. 335 Ideally, the
President and the Congress should work together to shape a consistent,
coherent foreign policy; constitutionally, it follows that the President should
not preempt Congress's power to authorize war by presenting afait accompli.
If the President is determined to act unilaterally, however, Congress is at
a distinct institutional disadvantage in asserting its prerogatives effectively
because the tools at its disposal, such as the power of the purse, are often
blunter than those ideally suited to the situation. For example, although many
members of Congress opposed President Clinton's plan to send U.S. forces to
Haiti to depose the Cedras regime and restore President Aristide to power, they
were equally (and understandably) opposed to cutting off funds prospectively
or otherwise impairing the President's ability to engage in coercive diplomacy
with General Raoul Cedras.336 In other words, restricting funds in advance
is often not an optimal response because it can harm the President's ability to
carry out effective diplomacy. On the other hand, cutting off funds after a
deployment has just taken place can be problematic as well because it
undercuts both the troops in the field and American credibility with allies.
Congress, of course, can terminate funding for operations that it determines no
longer serve American interests, as it did in Vietnam and, two decades later,
in Somalia. Indeed, Congress's power of the purse remains its most potent tool
in restraining executive military action, and its effectiveness may be greater in
the post-Cold War period when fewer military engagements stem from
immediate and pressing national security crises. My point is simply that this
tool can be a very blunt one, and that the President, in the fast-moving world
of diplomacy, inevitably possesses an enormous practical ability to shape the
"antecedent state of things."
A third and final factor that has contributed to Congress's reduced role in
contemporary war powers decisions is linked to America's global prominence
and the dangers of the Cold War years. As a normative matter, many U.S.
policymakers (including many members of Congress) have come to believe
that the President should be free to send American forces into hostilities,
without congressional authorization, to protect U.S. national interests as the
President sees them, at least in cases that do not involve sustained combat with
a major adversary.337 Though probably not Congress's intent in 1973,338
335. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 35 (quoting Hamilton). At the same time, Schlesinger continues,
"[i]f Congress were to claim all the implications of its power to authorize hostilities, it could swallow up
much of the presidential power to conduct diplomacy." Id.
336. See Stromseth, supra note 139, at 173, 175-76, 178. As Senator Pell explained, if President
Clinton's efforts to persuade General Cedras to depart voluntarily were to succeed, "the possibility of the
use of force to remove the junta cannot be taken off the table or called into question." 140 CONo. REC.
S 10,668 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1994) (statement of Sen. Pell).
337. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMrrMENTS REPORT, supra note 9, at 15-26 (discussing views of
legislative and executive branch officials from late 1940s to late 1960s); Lobel, supra note 173, at 63-64
(discussing more recent views). Indeed, thoughtful commentators on both ends of the war powers spectrum
have emphasized the connection that exists between substantive views about American foreign policy and
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its behavior under the War Powers Resolution seems largely to accord with
this substantive view: So long as a war is over within sixty days (and the
adversary is comparatively weak), the President can expect little effective
opposition from Congress in sending U.S. forces into hostilities. 39 If
Congress's diminished role in decisions to commit U.S. forces to combat since
World War II is rooted, at least in part, in the three factors I have
identified-congressional reluctance to take a prospective stand for which
voters might hold members accountable; diplomatic realities that make it
difficult for Congress to use the tools at its disposal prospectively; and
substantive views supporting broader scope for unilateral executive
action-then it is hard to see how urging Congress to exercise the
constitutional powers at its disposal (or to beef up the War Powers Resolution)
will go very far in changing the situation.
Another recent development, however, offers promise for restoring a war
powers balance between Congress and the President: the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War rivalry. Just as the Cold War led
to an expansion of presidential war power, its demise may lead to a more
assertive congressional role and may, perhaps, moderate the force of the three
factors I have mentioned. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the sense
of crisis and emergency that pervaded the Cold War years and the overarching
focus on containing communism have been replaced by a more complex, and
less bipolar, foreign policy outlook. In the face of less obvious external threats
and more varied U.S. security interests, members of Congress are likely to face
fewer electoral risks in challenging the President's foreign policy choices, and
thus may not hesitate to do so.? Congress (and the public at large) are more
likely to challenge presidential military commitments in situations that do not
implicate fundamental U.S. national security interests in any clear way.
Whether American forces should be sent into hostilities to protect democracy,
to safeguard basic human rights, or to provide urgent humanitarian assistance,
for example, are issues that already have generated considerable domestic
debate in individual contexts, such as Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia. Just
as members of Congress and the public at large may be divided on such issues,
their willingness to support unilateral presidential action likely will be reduced.
In short, differing substantive views about the proper U.S. role in the post-Cold
War world both may modify beliefs in the need for unilateral presidential
action (at least in cases that do not implicate traditional and urgent American
attitudes about the appropriate process for committing U.S. forces abroad. See. e g.. id. at 62-64. Rostow,
supra note 63, at 51.
338. See War Powers Resolution § 2(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1994).
339. In other words, Congress's actions under the War Powers Resolution have tended to reinforce
a kind of de facto presidential power to engage in "'short wars" and in "'small-scale" hostilities.
340. See Randall B. Ripley & James M. Lindsay. Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: An
Overview and Preview, in CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POuCY ON CAPITOL HILL 3.
13 (Randall B. Ripley & James M. Lindsay eds., 1993).
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security interests) and will reduce the electoral risks associated with
challenging the President on military decisions.
In addition, the kinds of crises so pervasive in the post-Cold War
environment-violent ethnic conflicts, major humanitarian crises, and human
rights violations growing out of longstanding political turmoil-cannot be
resolved with quick and "immaculate" interventions. To address the causes of
such conflicts in any enduring way will often require a long and costly
international commitment of resources, both civilian and military. Bosnia is a
good example. The very length and cost of such a commitment necessarily will
enhance Congress's influence over the U.S. role in such conflicts, through its
power of the purse. Ultimately, Congress will not be able to avoid taking a
stand when the issue of funding such operations is presented. While a strong
case for U.S. involvement in securing the peace in cases such as Bosnia can
and should be made,34t Congress and the American public are likely to be
cautious about expensive military commitments abroad that compete for scarce
economic resources in the face of less immediate or obvious security threats
to the United States.
For all these reasons, Congress is likely to play a more significant role, at
least over time, when American combat forces are deployed into situations of
risk and instability. But what will become of the comfortable "tacit deal"
between Congress and the President highlighted by John Ely? Congress's
willingness in the years ahead to take a prospective stand on the deployment
of U.S. forces into hostilities, and the President's willingness to give up
longstanding patterns of unilateral action (turning to Congress only for last-
minute consultation and "support") is by no means certain. Moreover, enduring
diplomatic realities both give the President the power to affect afait accompli
and make Congress understandably reluctant to cut off options in advance. So
far, the experiences in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia do not provide much reason
for predicting a greater presidential willingness to seek (or congressional
willingness to provide) prospective authorization before U.S. forces are sent
into hostilities. Presidents are used to deciding first and consulting Congress
afterwards; Congress is used to "auditioning" combat operations and later
disavowing those that turn sour.
Yet even in cases where prior congressional authorization is not compelled
by either the Constitution or the War Powers Resolution, it remains important
prudentially. If U.S. forces are deployed for an extended period of time in a
situation of risk and instability, ongoing congressional support will be essential
to the success of the operation, even if it does not involve major combat risks
or sustained hostilities. This is particularly true in cases that do not implicate
341. See, e.g., Stanley Hoffmann, In Defense of Mother Teresa: Morality in Foreign Policy, FORBION
AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 172-75 (defending broader, more humanitarian conception of U.S. national
interests in post-Cold War world).
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core U.S. security interests in any obvious way. Unless Congress and the
American public understand the purposes, benefits, and risks of these
operations in advance, and unless congressional support is sustained as a
mission evolves, American policy will be vulnerable to abrupt reversal by
Congress in the face of adversity, as we saw in Somalia.- 2 Without clear
congressional support, moreover, troop morale may suffer, and both our allies
and our adversaries may doubt the credibility of our commitment.
Whether Congress and the President will begin to work together more
constructively regarding future decisions to commit U.S. forces to hostilities
in the post-Cold War world, both in the UN context and more generally, is not
yet clear. Some statutory measures could be helpful in encouraging a greater
prospective role for Congress, including the requirement of timely
consultations and regular reports on ongoing and future UN operations in
which U.S. forces might participate and for which U.S. funding is
essential. 3 Whether the War Powers Resolution should be reformed in light
of past experience and current realities, and if so, how, requires careful
reexamination. 3" But something deeper is required: an honest and searching
342. See Stromseth, supra note 139. at 170-72.
343. The Clinton Administration committed itself to regular consultations with Congress in its Policy
on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (May 1994). reprnted in FtstiE. supra note 4. at 224-25 app.
G. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 mandated periodic reports to
Congress, and these reporting requirements remain in effect as of December 1996. See 22 U.S.C. § 287b(a)
(1994). Each month the President is required to consult with Congress and to provide information to
designated congressional committees on the anticipated duration, mandate, cost. and command and control
arrangements of United Nations peacekeeping operations and on U.S. participation in those operations. See
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995. Pub. L No. 103-236. § 407(a). 108 Stat.
382, 448-49 (1994), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 287b note at 557. The President must also notify Congress
15 days in advance of any provision of assistance by the United States to a United Nations peacekeeping
mission, and the President must notify Congress five days in advance of any Security Council vote on a
resolution creating a new peacekeeping operation. See id. A more recently enacted piece of legislation, the
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996. stipulates that none of the funds made
available for "Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities" can be spent for any new or
expanded United Nations peacekeeping operation authonzed by the Security Council. unless the President
reports to Congress 15 days in advance on "the estimated cost and length of the mission, the vital national
interest that will be served, and the planned exit strategy." Pub. L No. 104-134. 1996 U.S.C.C A.N. 99
(110 Stat. 1321). Another provision within the Omnibus Act prohibits funds from being used for UN
peacekeeping missions where U.S. forces are under the command or operational control of a foreign
national, unless the President reports to Congress that the mission is in U.S. national security interests. See
id. at 160.
344. This is a complex and difficult question beyond the scope of this Book Review Four major
alternatives present themselves: strengthen the War Powers Resolution, repeal it in part, repeal it
completely, or essentially leave it as is. Fisher, joining ranks with scholars such as John Ely and with
former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, advocates the first alternative. See FISHER. supra note 4, at 191-94;
see also ELY, supra note 6, at 63-66, 115-38; John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers
Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1379 (1988); Cyrus R. Vance. Striking the Balance: Congress and
the President Under the War Powers Resolution. 133 U. PA. L. REv. 79. 90 (1984) ('he Resolution
reinforces presidential self-restraint and serves as a constant reminder that policies involving the use of
force overseas must gamer support beyond the short-term."). Reforming the War Powers Resolution by
strengthening its provisions, however, presupposes that Congress. to paraphrase John Ely. wants a Var
Powers Act that works. See Ely, supra. Partial repeal of the Resolution, however, is the reform most likely
to succeed. Proposals to repeal the Resolution's 60-day time clock and concurrent resolution provisions and
to turn it effectively into a consultation and reporting mechanism have circulated for some time. The 1988
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dialogue within and between the executive and legislative branches about the
nature of American interests in the post-Cold War world and the situations that
warrant placing U.S. forces in harm's way; 345 and a reexamination of the
basic purposes reflected in the Constitution's allocation of war powers and
their implications for the full range of military operations, many under UN
authorization, in which the United States participates today.
V. CONCLUSION
The end of the Cold War provides a unique opportunity to reassess war
powers, including the expansion of presidential power during the Cold War
years, and, perhaps, to contemplate a return to the traditions of joint executive-
congressional action that marked earlier periods of our Republic. We should,
in short, take seriously the fundamental message of Fisher's book, namely, that
all of us (scholars, the general public, the President, Congress, other public
servants) should stop at this critical juncture to reexamine the principles and
values underlying the Founders' decision to allocate war powers as they did,
and to evaluate our historical practice in the two centuries since the
Constitution's ratification. Particularly because so few judicial decisions
address war powers, the original understanding and historical practice provide
the best guidance available.
Although Fisher's book paints in bold strokes and leaves out some
important nuances, the clarity of his analysis serves a very useful purpose: It
brings into sharp focus the central methodological and normative issues that
must be addressed (but too often are submerged) as scholars, politicians, and
citizens alike consider how to understand the Constitution's allocation of war
Byrd-Nunn-Warner-Mitchell proposal aimed to improve interbranch consultation by designating a core
group of congressional leaders with whom the President could easily and regularly consult. See S.J. Res.
323, 100th Cong. (1988).
More recent initiatives, by Representative Hyde in the House and former Majority Leader Dole in the
Senate, made no effort to strengthen consulting arrangements. See House Amendment to H.R. 1561, 104th
Cong. (1995), 141 CONG. REC. H5655 (daily ed. June 7, 1995); S. 5, 104th Cong. (1995). The Hyde
amendment, rejected by the House of Representatives by a narrow margin in June 1995, would have
repealed most of the War Powers Resolution and let stand only the requirement that the President "consult
[Congress] in every possible instance" before introducing U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities
and "report" to Congress within 48 hours after doing so. 141 CONG. REc. H5655, H5673 (daily ed. June
7, 1995). The thoughtful debate preceding the House's rejection of the Hyde amendment illuminates why
the War Powers Resolution-with all its flaws-may remain on the books in its current form for some time
to come. Many members of Congress are reluctant to abandon the one major congressional effort in the
postwar era to restrain unilateral executive military action when it possibly has had at least some
constraining effect. What is striking today, however, is that scholars on opposite sides of the constitutional
debate over war powers have come to advocate the Resolution's repeal, although for different reasons,
Compare, e.g., Glennon, supra note 289, at 17-21, 28-31 (advocating Resolution's repeal because it is
unworkable in current political climate), with ROBERT TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLTION 133 (1983)
(advocating Resolution's repeal because it is in tension with Constitution and practical diplomatic realities),
For a defense of retaining the resolution despite its flaws, see Henkin, supra note 325, at 204-06.
345. This dialogue could begin, perhaps, by establishing a diverse congressional consultative group
that could meet regularly with the President to discuss broad future directions for American foreign policy.
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powers. Unfortunately, during the Cold War years, much of the debate over
war powers had a decidedly polemical quality, rooted in part in the sense of
emergency and danger of that period and also in differing reactions to the
divisive Vietnam experience. We now have an opportunity to move beyond the
polemics of the Cold War period.
This is not to contend that agreement will be found on the many war
powers issues that have long divided thoughtful scholars and preoccupied
public servants in both the legislative and executive branches. But if we were
at least more honest about our areas of difference, we might begin to have a
more fruitful discussion-about what the Founders' values and animating
purposes were (and about gaps in what we know of their original
understanding); about how their values and purposes should be understood or
translated in our very different world; about what our intervening history
means; and finally, about whether the Founders' values should be and still are
our values today.

